Appendix

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A Survey Information and Question Wording

Before beginning the survey, participants were presented with an informed consent statement which named the research study, the individuals conducting the study, and their respective institutions. Respondents were told that the survey explores individuals' political views and behavior, and that they were randomly selected from a publicly available list. Additionally, they were informed of the estimated length of the survey, that their answers are completely confidential, that their participation is completely voluntary, and that they may skip any question. Participants were also informed that risks for participation in the study are minimal, and the benefits are the researchers increasing their knowledge of citizens' opinions. To provide answers to any questions that respondents had about the survey, we provided our contact information, a web page with answers to additional questions about the survey, as well as the phone number for the appropriate Institutional Review Board.

We asked all respondents a series of direct questions about their motivation for giving as well as a series of multifactorial vignettes. Every respondent was asked to self-report their partisanship and the answer was used to insert either "Democratic" or "Republican" in the $OwnParty$ variable. The variable $OutParty$ is defined by the opposite party to $OwnParty$.

> In choosing $OwnParty$ primary candidates to contribute to in House races, which is more important to you?
>
> - Making sure that the $OwnParty$ Party nominates candidates who can win elections
>
> - Making sure that the $OwnParty$ Party nominates candidates who represent my views on important issues
>
> Which better characterizes your decision to contribute to a specific $OwnParty$ House candidate in the general election?
>
> - I care more about the candidate's positions
>
> - I care more about the candidate's chances of winning the election

B Vignette Wording

All respondents were presented with five hypothetical same-party House candidates and asked how likely they would be to contribute to each candidate using a five-point scale. For respondents who identified as partisans (94% of our sample), the candidate was assigned to match their stated partisanship, with partisanship randomly assigned for non-partisans. Respondents were assigned five primary election vignettes or five general election vignettes with equal probability. See 2 for description of vignette features.

B.1 Primary Vignettes

Respondents were introduced to the task using the following lead-in:

> We will next present you with 5 different $OwnParty$ candidates who are likely to be running for DIFFERENT House races in the next election cycle.
>
> Suppose you were approached by each candidate. How likely would you be to donate to their campaign during the PRIMARY election?
>
> For each candidate, we will ask you to tell us your chances of contributing on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 means you would certainly give, 0 means you would not give, and 50 means it is a coin toss.

After this explanation, each respondent was shown 5 hypothetical comparisons. Each comparison appeared on a separate page of the survey so a respondent was looking at a single race at a time. Each of the listed variables refers to a randomized choice of feature listed previously: $DistrictChar1$, $CandViability1$, $CandIdeo1$, $OpponentChar1$, $OutParty$, and $OppenentType1$.

> Candidate 1 [NAME WITHELD] is a primary election candidate in [ANOTHER STATE]. The district $DistrictChar1$. Your party's candidate $CandViability1$. They hold policy positions that are $CandIdeo1$. The will likely face $OpponentChar1$ $OutParty$ $OppenentType1$. What are the chances you would contribute to this candidate?

- I would almost certainly NOT contribute (0-10%)

- Not very likely (10-35%)

- Close to even (35-65%)

- Very likely (65-90%)

- I would almost certainly contribute (90-100%)

B.2 General Vignettes

> We will next present you with 5 different $OwnParty$ candidates who are likely to be running for DIFFERENT House races in the next election cycle.
>
> Suppose you were approached by each candidate. How likely would you be to donate to their campaign during the GENERAL election?
>
> For each candidate, we will ask you to tell us your chances of contributing on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 means you would certainly give, 0 means you would not give, and 50 means it is a coin toss.

Each respondent was shown 5 candidates with randomized features:

Candidate 1 [NAME WITHELD] is a general election candidate in [ANOTHER STATE]. The district $DistrictChar1$. Your party's candidate $CandViability1$. They hold policy positions that are $CandIdeo1$. The will likely face $OpponentChar1$ $OutParty$ $OppenentType1$. What are the chances you would contribute to this candidate?

- I would almost certainly NOT contribute (0-10%)

- Not very likely (10-35%)

- Close to even (35-65%)

- Very likely (65-90%)

- I would almost certainly contribute (90-100%)

C Vignette Regression Tables

Due to the number of covariates associated with our treatment conditions and our focus on comparing heterogeneous effects, we present our regression results graphically throughout the paper.

The numbers that correspond to the point estimates and standard errors from all of our coefficient plots are presented in the following tables. Each column represents a separate regression run on the relevant group, including vignette order fixed effects and standard errors clustered by respondent.

Table A1: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Giving, by Motivation and Extremism

	Pooled	Motivation		Self-Report		Issue-Based	
		Issues	Winning	Extreme	Non-Extreme	Extreme	Non-Extreme
(Intercept)	0.338***	0.345***	0.381***	0.388***	0.329***	0.399***	0.326***
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.012)
District leans other party	−0.064***	−0.063***	−0.103***	−0.077***	−0.061***	−0.074***	−0.063***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.007)
District leans your party	−0.067***	−0.067***	−0.082***	−0.088***	−0.064***	−0.070***	−0.068***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Has key endorsements	0.029**	0.002	0.020	0.042	0.025**	−0.005	0.035***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.009)
Has raised money	0.013	0.004	0.011	0.009	0.014	0.021	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.009)
District enthusiasm	0.021*	0.008	0.029	0.050*	0.015	0.026	0.018
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.009)
Barely lost last time	0.048***	0.051***	0.041*	0.065**	0.042***	0.084***	0.039***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.009)
Somewhat more moderate	−0.182***	−0.186***	−0.142***	−0.238***	−0.171***	−0.240***	−0.171***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.008)
Somewhat more extreme	−0.027***	−0.001	−0.015	0.041*	−0.040***	0.022	−0.036***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.008)
Much more extreme	−0.091***	−0.094***	−0.106***	0.026	−0.113***	−0.022	−0.104***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.008)
Extreme opponent	0.097***	0.096***	0.128***	0.096***	0.098***	0.094***	0.099***
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Incumbent opponent	0.009	−0.001	0.020	0.021	0.007	0.014	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Primary	−0.022***	−0.020*	−0.085***	−0.044**	−0.017**	−0.008	−0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Vignette 2	0.026**	0.016	0.060**	0.041	0.021*	0.024	0.026**
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.009)
Vignette 3	0.033***	0.016	0.086***	0.044*	0.030**	0.047*	0.031***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.009)
Vignette 4	0.045***	0.045**	0.086***	0.035	0.046***	0.042	0.045***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.009)
Vignette 5	0.044***	0.044**	0.085***	0.064**	0.040***	0.047*	0.043***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.009)
Num.Obs.	28 090	9148	5614	4823	23 192	4754	23 336
R2	0.041	0.046	0.054	0.076	0.039	0.066	0.039

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A2: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Giving, by Partisanship and Extremism

	Self-ID Extreme		Self-ID Non-Extreme		Issue Extreme		Issue Non-Extreme	
	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats
(Intercept)	0.402***	0.388***	0.319***	0.336***	0.401***	0.395***	0.312***	0.335***
	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.057)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.014)
District leans other party	−0.086*	−0.076***	−0.062***	−0.060***	−0.134***	−0.046*	−0.052***	−0.069***
	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.008)
District leans your party	−0.083*	−0.094***	−0.072***	−0.060***	−0.116**	−0.051**	−0.065***	−0.070***
	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.008)
Has key endorsements	−0.006	0.063*	−0.007	0.044***	−0.027	0.010	−0.001	0.057***
	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Has raised money	−0.009	0.020	0.011	0.015	0.030	0.024	0.009	0.014
	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)
District enthusiasm	0.023	0.061*	0.000	0.022*	0.015	0.035	0.004	0.026*
	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Barely lost last time	0.036	0.081***	0.034	0.046***	0.067	0.089***	0.028	0.044***
	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Somewhat more moderate	−0.248***	−0.230***	−0.187***	−0.161***	−0.210***	−0.250***	−0.195***	−0.157***
	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Somewhat more extreme	0.111**	0.007	−0.016	−0.055***	0.154***	−0.039	−0.019	−0.046***
	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Much more extreme	0.016	0.031	−0.081***	−0.132***	0.003	−0.033	−0.080***	−0.118***
	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Extreme opponent	0.116***	0.084***	0.078***	0.110***	0.115***	0.087***	0.082***	0.109***
	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Incumbent opponent	0.007	0.024	0.005	0.008	−0.023	0.030	0.010	0.008
	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Primary	−0.136***	−0.002	−0.011	−0.022**	−0.034	0.002	−0.030**	−0.022**
	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Vignette 2	0.047	0.034	0.015	0.024*	0.031	0.020	0.021	0.027*
	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Vignette 3	0.074	0.024	0.033	0.029**	0.073	0.041	0.038*	0.027*
	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Vignette 4	0.064	0.018	0.057**	0.039***	0.058	0.033	0.060***	0.036***
	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Vignette 5	0.088	0.047	0.048**	0.035**	0.090	0.026	0.051**	0.038***
	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Num.Obs.	1031	3792	5861	17331	1047	3707	5860	17476
R2	0.122	0.066	0.043	0.039	0.107	0.057	0.046	0.039

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A3: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Giving, by Extremism with Party Interaction

|	All	Self-Reported Extreme	Self-Reported Non-Extreme	Issue-Based Extreme	Issue-Based Non-Extreme
(Intercept)	0.394***	0.451***	0.382***	0.421***	0.392***
	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.017)
Republican	−0.008	−0.126	0.018	−0.015	−0.031
	(0.028)	(0.067)	(0.030)	(0.055)	(0.036)
District leans other party	−0.088***	−0.110***	−0.083***	−0.089***	−0.090***
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.010)
District leans your party	−0.087***	−0.141***	−0.077***	−0.078**	−0.091***
	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.010)
Has key endorsements	0.057***	0.062*	0.055***	0.023	0.063***
	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.013)
Has raised money	0.012	−0.020	0.019	0.019	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.013)
District enthusiasm	0.036**	0.067*	0.027*	0.047	0.029*
	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.013)
Barely lost last time	0.065***	0.082**	0.062***	0.108**	0.055***
	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.013)
Somewhat more moderate	−0.211***	−0.275***	−0.196***	−0.279***	−0.197***
	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.012)
Somewhat more extreme	−0.055***	0.015	−0.069***	−0.020	−0.061***
	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.012)
Much more extreme	−0.133***	0.031	−0.166***	−0.019	−0.152***
	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.012)
Extreme opponent	0.128***	0.101***	0.136***	0.093***	0.135***
	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.008)
Incumbent opponent	0.014	0.032	0.011	0.034	0.011
	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.008)
Primary	−0.012	−0.004	−0.014	0.031	−0.021*
	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.008)
Vignette 2	0.031*	0.040	0.029*	0.029	0.032*
	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.013)
Vignette 3	0.035**	0.024	0.036**	0.032	0.035**
	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.013)
Vignette 4	0.042***	0.025	0.047***	0.047	0.041**
	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.013)
Vignette 5	0.044***	0.058*	0.041**	0.022	0.048***
	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.013)
Republican*District leans other party	0.005	0.038	−0.001	0.026	−0.015
	(0.017)	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.021)
Republican*District leans your party	−0.001	0.109**	−0.024	−0.011	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.021)
Republican*Has key endorsements	−0.053*	−0.009	−0.057*	−0.026	−0.049
	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.028)
Republican*Has raised money	0.022	0.060	0.016	0.032	0.009
	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.028)
Republican*District enthusiasm	−0.024	−0.010	−0.022	−0.022	−0.023
	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Republican*Barely lost last time	−0.046*	−0.067	−0.043	−0.095*	−0.027
	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Republican*Somewhat more moderate	−0.054**	−0.053	−0.056**	−0.039	−0.003
	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.025)
Republican*Somewhat more extreme	0.020	0.101*	0.001	0.062	−0.046
	(0.019)	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.024)
Republican*Much more extreme	0.035	−0.002	0.047*	−0.047	0.017
	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.025)
Republican*Extreme opponent	−0.012	0.028	−0.023	0.015	−0.014
	(0.013)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.018)
Republican*Incumbent opponent	0.001	−0.014	0.004	−0.016	0.000
	(0.013)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.018)
Republican*Primary	−0.024	−0.060	−0.015	−0.082**	0.005
	(0.013)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.018)
Republican*Vignette 2	0.006	0.031	−0.004	0.004	0.015
	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Republican*Vignette 3	0.023	0.076	0.010	0.041	0.004
	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Republican*Vignette 4	0.046*	0.080	0.033	0.051	0.025
	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Republican*Vignette 5	0.035	0.058	0.025	0.058	0.024
	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Num.Obs.	21 105	3803	17 262	5281	15 824
R2	0.064	0.122	0.061	0.104	0.060

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

D Vignette Results by Other Subsets

D.1 Primary and General Election

For our main analyses, we pooled across primary election and general election vignettes for reasons of statistical power after finding little difference by contest type. Indeed, an F-test determined that contest-type interaction terms from an unrestricred model were jointly insignificant ($F = 1.1022$, $p = 0.3494$). The vignette regression results by primary and general election types are presented below.

Figure A1: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Type of Contest

Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–1)

Note: Models include vignette order fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

D.2 Vignette Order

In the main analyses, we include vignette order fixed effects to account for a change in general likelihood of wanting to contribute by the order in which the vignette was presented to the donor. Running separate models by vignette order shows only minor effect

differences across the order in which the vignettes were presented.

Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Vignette Order

Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–1)

Note: Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

D.3 Partisanship

Figure A2: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Respondent Partisanship


Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–1)

Note: Models include vignette order fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level.Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

D.4 Net Worth

We compare the effects of the vignette treatments on likelihood of contribution among donors with a net worth above and below $1 million.

Figure A3: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Net Worth

Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–1)

Note: Models include vignette order fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level.Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

D.5   Number of Contributions

We compare the effects of the vignette treatments on likelihood of contribution among those whom the FEC reported making five or fewer contributions in the 2018 election cycle versus those who made six (the median number) or more contributions.

Figure A4: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Number of Contributions


Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–1)

Note: Models include vignette order fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level.Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

D.6 Contribution Amount

We compare the effects of the vignette treatments on likelihood of contribution among those whom the FEC reported contributing a total of under $650 (the median amount) in the 2018 election cycle versus those who contributed $650 or more.

Figure A5: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Total Contribution Amount

Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–1)

Note: Models include vignette order fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

D.7 Small Donors

We compare the effects of the vignette treatments on likelihood of contribution between those who contributed under $200 — the amount at which the FEC requires itemized reporting — and those who contributed at least $200. Donors contributing under $200 are commonly regarded as small donors, but many campaigns nevertheless choose to report contributions beyond what the FEC requires. 18% of donors in our sample contributed less than $200 according to the FEC.

Figure A6: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Small and Non-Small Donors

Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–1)

Note: Models include vignette order fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

D.8   Out-Of-State and In-State Donors

We compare the effects of vignette treatments on donors who only contributed to 2018 House races out-of-state to those who only contributed in-state. Effects are largely similar, suggesting that in-state donors would react similarly to out-of-state donors if they gave out of state.

Figure A6: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by In- and Out-of-State Donors


Note: Models include vignette order fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

D.9 Treatment Interaction

We partition the sample by district lean treatment and opponent extremism treatment to identify whether district competitiveness or ideological extremity of the opponent changes how donors react to other candidate and electoral considerations.

Figure A7: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by District and Opponent Characteristics


Note: Models include vignette order fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. District context, opponent ideology, and all covariates are randomized. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

E   Vignette Results with 5-point Linear DV

Our experimental vignettes asked donors how likely they were to contribute to a given candidate, with response options on a 5-point labeled scale: I would almost certainly NOT contribute (0-10%), Not very likely (10-35%), Close to even (35-65%), Very likely (65-90%), and I would almost certainly contribute (90-100%).

In our vignette results for the sake of interpretation, we recoded these responses into a binary contribution variable where a response of Very Likely or Almost Certain is a 1, and 0 otherwise. Below, we replicate the vignette coefficient plots with the full 5-point linear scale, and produce a regression table with the 5-point DV results presented numerically.

Figure A7: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing


Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–4)

Note: Models include vignette fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. Covariates are randomized same-party candidate ideology, and outcome is self-reported likelihood of contributing to candidate, from 0 = Would almost certainly NOT contribute (0-10%) to 4 = Would almost certainly contribute (90-100%).

Figure A8: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Self-Reported Donation Motivation

Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–4)

Note: Models include vignette fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. Covariates are randomized same-party candidate ideology, and outcome is self-reported likelihood of contributing to candidate, from 0 = Would almost certainly NOT contribute (0-10%) to 4 = Would almost certainly contribute (90-100%).

Figure A9: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing by Extremism


Note: Models include vignette fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. Covariates are randomized same-party candidate ideology, and outcome is self-reported likelihood of contributing to candidate, from 0 = Would almost certainly NOT contribute (0-10%) to 4 = Would almost certainly contribute (90-100%).

Figure A10: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing by Extremism and Party

Note: Models include vignette fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. Covariates are randomized same-party candidate ideology, and outcome is self-reported likelihood of contributing to candidate, from 0 = Would almost certainly NOT contribute (0-10%) to 4 = Would almost certainly contribute (90-100%).

Table A4: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Linear Likelihood of Giving, by Motivation and Extremism

	Pooled	Motivation		Self-Report		Issue-Based	
		Issues	Winning	Extreme	Non-Extreme	Extreme	Non-Extreme
(Intercept)	1.885***	1.898***	2.049***	2.092***	1.845***	2.093***	1.847***
	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.031)	(0.067)	(0.031)
District leans other party	−0.213***	−0.197***	−0.246***	−0.265***	−0.201***	−0.265***	−0.206***
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.019)
District leans your party	−0.170***	−0.168***	−0.171***	−0.219***	−0.163***	−0.213***	−0.166***
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.019)	(0.040)	(0.019)
Has key endorsements	0.075***	0.018	0.065	0.111*	0.067**	0.010	0.088***
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.053)	(0.024)
Has raised money	0.025	−0.005	0.005	−0.005	0.034	0.035	0.026
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.053)	(0.024)
District enthusiasm	0.066**	0.020	0.075	0.093	0.058*	0.081	0.056*
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.024)
Barely lost last time	0.130***	0.121**	0.101*	0.121*	0.126***	0.224***	0.103***
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.051)	(0.024)
Somewhat more moderate	−0.477***	−0.501***	−0.342***	−0.625***	−0.446***	−0.642***	−0.445***
	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.022)	(0.046)	(0.022)
Somewhat more extreme	−0.052**	0.018	−0.026	0.114*	−0.085***	0.084	−0.077***
	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.022)	(0.046)	(0.022)
Much more extreme	−0.235***	−0.201***	−0.270***	0.087	−0.293***	−0.009	−0.276***
	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.022)	(0.047)	(0.022)
Extreme opponent	0.261***	0.241***	0.316***	0.267***	0.264***	0.274***	0.262***
	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.015)
Incumbent opponent	0.035*	0.025	0.057	0.060	0.033*	0.051	0.036*
	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.015)
Primary	−0.093***	−0.127***	−0.220***	−0.121***	−0.087***	−0.071*	−0.097***
	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.015)
Vignette 2	0.069**	0.062	0.111*	0.082	0.064**	0.079	0.067**
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.024)
Vignette 3	0.116***	0.114**	0.160***	0.090	0.119***	0.147**	0.110***
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.024)
Vignette 4	0.140***	0.151***	0.189***	0.076	0.150***	0.097	0.145***
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.024)
Vignette 5	0.129***	0.136***	0.158**	0.154**	0.124***	0.140**	0.126***
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.024)
Num.Obs.	28090	9148	5614	4823	23192	4754	23336
R2	0.047	0.053	0.055	0.091	0.044	0.091	0.043

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A5: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Linear Likelihood of Giving, by Partisanship and Extremism

	Self-ID Extreme		Self-ID Non-Extreme		Issue Extreme		Issue Non-Extreme	
	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats
(Intercept)	2.060***	2.128***	1.768***	1.898***	2.030***	2.124***	1.765***	1.900***
	(0.146)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.036)	(0.141)	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.036)
District leans other party	−0.309***	−0.247***	−0.235***	−0.179***	−0.414***	−0.197***	−0.212***	−0.197***
	(0.092)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.089)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.021)
District leans your party	−0.235**	−0.221***	−0.152***	−0.172***	−0.280**	−0.188***	−0.140***	−0.181***
	(0.090)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.021)
Has key endorsements	0.009	0.159**	−0.020	0.121***	−0.033	0.045	−0.010	0.148***
	(0.118)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.112)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.027)
Has raised money	−0.054	0.023	0.017	0.043	0.053	0.050	0.009	0.037
	(0.119)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.116)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.027)
District enthusiasm	0.043	0.114*	0.020	0.076**	0.068	0.098	0.024	0.074**
	(0.119)	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.116)	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.027)
Barely lost last time	0.016	0.187**	0.126*	0.126***	0.185	0.246***	0.091	0.111***
	(0.109)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.107)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)
Somewhat more moderate	−0.693***	−0.589***	−0.539***	−0.389***	−0.701***	−0.601***	−0.542***	−0.387***
	(0.104)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.100)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.024)
Somewhat more extreme	0.297**	0.025	−0.007	−0.136***	0.298**	−0.011	0.002	−0.127***
	(0.102)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.102)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.024)
Much more extreme	0.149	0.057	−0.218***	−0.340***	0.123	−0.069	−0.219***	−0.312***
	(0.106)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.103)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.024)
Extreme opponent	0.331***	0.229***	0.215***	0.295***	0.330***	0.243***	0.220***	0.290***
	(0.074)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.072)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.017)
Incumbent opponent	0.016	0.073*	0.005	0.045**	−0.054	0.101**	0.016	0.041*
	(0.074)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.072)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.017)
Primary	−0.252***	−0.072*	−0.068*	−0.107***	−0.088	−0.078*	−0.097**	−0.105***
	(0.074)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.072)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.017)
Vignette 2	0.068	0.076	0.029	0.082**	0.114	0.054	0.026	0.087**
	(0.117)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.113)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)
Vignette 3	0.137	0.058	0.128**	0.114***	0.286*	0.094	0.111*	0.109***
	(0.116)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.113)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)
Vignette 4	0.113	0.047	0.168***	0.141***	0.164	0.054	0.155**	0.139***
	(0.116)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.114)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)
Vignette 5	0.191	0.124*	0.133**	0.118***	0.263*	0.075	0.123*	0.126***
	(0.117)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.113)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.027)
Num.Obs.	1031	3792	5861	17331	1047	3707	5860	17476
R2	0.134	0.077	0.052	0.045	0.146	0.072	0.051	0.044

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

# F Measuring Donor Ideology with Issue Questions

To check the robustness of our finding that donors who identified as Extremely Liberal or Extremely Conservative on a 7-point ideology scale are significantly less likely to contribute to a moderate candidate than those who did not identify as extreme (Figure 6), we employ an alternative measure of extremism.

Elsewhere in the survey, we asked respondents their positions on 49 issue questions such as the top marginal tax rate, fuel emissions standards, and more. Given the missingness that plagues survey data and traditional principal component analysis' inability to handle missing data, we performed a Bayesian principal components analysis using `bpca` in the `pcaMethods` package in `R`.

First, we pre-processed the data by pulling out the issue position survey items, recoding responses to consistently range from most liberal to most conservative where possible, and de-meaning and standardizing the scales of the survey items. We then calculated a single principal component: the liberal-conservative dimension dominant in studies of public opinion and political elites. With these scores, we classified issue-based extremists as those in the top quantiles of the within-party proportions of self-reported extreme donors. About 15% of Republicans reported their ideology as "extremely conservative" and about 19% of Democrats reported their ideology as "extremely liberal", so we used these precise proportions to classify issue-based extremists as those in the equivalent quantiles of the PCA scores.

Given evidence that donors' positions may diverge more or less from the public's depending on issue area, we also re-run the PCA for separate social, economic, and globalism issue domains. Following the issue classification scheme used in Broockman and Malhotra (2020), we include 13 questions about guaranteed jobs, government spending, healthcare, minimum wage, TANF, and taxes in the economic dimension, 11 questions about abortion and gun control in the social dimension, and 13 questions about national defense, Trans-Pacific Partnership, immigration, isolationism, sanctions, and trade. As seen in Figure A16, relationships between the three domain-specific issue scales are very strong as are the relationships between each of them and the unidimensional scale. In Figure A17, we replicate our analysis on extreme and non-extreme donors on each of the domain-specific scales. Aside from some differences using the globalism issue scale, the results are similar across issue domain and strongly consistent with the original results pooling across all issue questions.

Figure A11: Relationships Between Issue-Based Ideology Measures

Note: Subfigures are scatterplots showing relationships between each dimension-specific and unidimensional PCA-based issue ideology measures with Pearson correlations above. Top plots are dimension-specific issue scores and bottom plots' x-axes are unidimensional issue scores with dimension-specific issue scores on y-axes. See beginning of Appendix F for PCA scaling details.

Figure A12: Average Effect of Vignette Manipulations on Likelihood of Contributing, by Issue Position Extremism

Economic

Social

Globalism

Effect on Reported Likelihood of Contributing (0–1)

Note: Models include vignette fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Hollow circles are above the equivalent self-reported quantile of extreme positions based on a Bayesian principal components analysis of survey questions associated with the issue dimension using `bpca` from the `pcaMethods` package in R. Filled circles are respondents below the specified quantile of issue extremism. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. Covariates are randomized district, same party candidate, and opposing party candidate traits. Outcome is 1 if respondent was "Very Likely" or "Almost Certain" to contribute, and 0 otherwise.

G Details on Donor/Respondent Weighting

To help ensure that our conclusions about the opinions of donors are representative we create post-stratification weights to correct for non-response. We contacted 69,062 donors who were verified as donating to a Congressional campaign in 2018 using the services of TargetSmart. The list of contacted donors was a random sample of records with valid mailing addresses from the file of verified donors (FECbase) of individuals.

Because the sampling frame is a random sample of the universe of donors (who are able to be matched to a voter file), we are able to compare the demographics of the donors who complete our survey to those who do not. For example, our letters and reminder postcards were able to obtain 7,335 completes (10.6%) but there was a partisan difference in who responded. Among registered Democrats, 13.6% of the contacted donors responded, but only 6.9% of registered Republicans completed the survey. Consistent with other work (e.g., Clinton 2021), differential partisan non-response affected our survey.

Because our sampling frame is a random sample of the target population, we use the parameters of the sampling frame to create weighting targets to create individual level weights so that the weighted sample of respondents matches the overall population of donors. This is important for ensuring that the relationships we find are not being driven by having a disproportionate number of Democrats in the sample, for example. The fact that we have voter file information on respondents and non-respondents allows us to use this information to construct the weights.

Table A6 reports the demographics of the Sampling Frame – i.e., the random sample of 69,000 verified donors with known addresses – and the sample of respondents to reveal the factors that were related to non-response. As noted, the largest difference is among partisanship – using either official party registration status or a measure of imputed partisanship based on demographics and precinct voting behavior – although other minor differences are also evident.

To create respondent weights that ensure that our analyses are representative of the larger population we create post-stratification weights using both iterative raking and the inverse of the propensity score. Iterative raking adjusts the weights so that the marginal distribution of each variable in the sample matches the marginal distribution in the population by adjusting the weights one-at-a-time and iterating until the weights are relatively stable. In other words, a sample weight is created for age – where "missing" is included as a weighting category - so that the weighted sample matches the age distribution in the sampling frame. A new weight is then created by making the age-weighted sample match the distribution of percentage registered Democrats in the sampling frame, that new weight is then used when making the age-Democrat-reweighted sample match the distribution of registered Republicans and so on. This process iterates over every marginal distribution until the weights are "stable." Figure A18 plots the resulting distribution for self-reported Republican and Democrat donors.

Reassuringly, the two weights correlate at 0.99 – indicating that the precise method of adjustment does not matter. Substantively, the effect of either weight is to increase the influence of Republican donors and decrease the influence of Democratic donors given the differential response rates noted at the outset.

Figure A13: Distribution of Respondent Weights by Self-Identified Partisanship

Figure 1: Inverse Propensity Score Weight   Figure 2: Raking Weight

Data is weighted to the sampling frame by party registration, wealth, gender, age, voter file partisanship, number of contributions, race, and turnout in 2016 primary general, 2016 general, and 2018 general.

Table A6: Sampling Frame and Respondent Demographics

Category	Sampling Frame	Donor Respondents
Sample Size	69,062	7,335
Age (Quartiles)		
< 53	18.8%	15.6%
53-63	20.1%	18.9%
64-73	19.3%	23.8%
73-100	21.5%	22.9%
Missing	20.3%	18.8%
Registered Democrat		
Yes	28.8%	36.8%
No	71.2%	63.2%
Registered Republican		
Yes	18.8%	12.4%
No	81.1%	87.6%
Imputed Partisanship (Quartiles)		
< 5	26.1%	18.1%
5-66	23.8%	17.9%
67-97	20.5%	23.1%
98+	29.5%	40.9%
Gender		
Male	54.2%	56.1%
Female	37.1%	36.0%
Missing	8.7%	7.9%
Race: Black?		
Yes	4.7%	3.9%
No	95.3%	96.1%
Wealth		
< $100k	14.9%	13.9%
$100k – $199k	12.1%	12.3%
$200k - $499k	10.9%	12.3%
$500k - $999k	11.3%	12.1%
$1 mil – $2.5 mil	13.8%	15.4%
$2.5 mil +	19.2%	18.2%
Missing	17.8%	15.8%
Voted in 2016 general?		
Yes	94.2%	97.2%
No	5.8%	2.8%
Voted in 2016 primary?		
Yes	26.4%	30.3%
No	73.6%	69.7%
Voted in 2018 general?		
Yes	91.9%	97.0%
No	8.1%	3.0%
Number of Contributions		
0	4.3%	2.6%
1	16.6%	16.0%
2	11.2%	11.5%
3	8.2%	8.0%
4	6.5%	6.8%
5-9	19.4%	20.6%
10-19	15.4%	16.6%
20-49	13.1%	12.7%
50+	5.2%	5.2%