Racial Resentment, Prejudice, and Discrimination

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Political scientists regularly measure anti-Black prejudice in the survey context using racial resentment, an indirect measure that blends racial animus with traditional moral values. Explicit prejudice, a direct measure based in beliefs about the group-level inferiority of Blacks, is used less frequently. We investigate whether these attitudes predict anti-Black discrimination and evaluations of the fairness of intergroup inequality. Study 1 used the Ultimatum Game to obtain a behavioral measure of racial discrimination and found whites engaged in anti-Black discrimination. Explicit prejudice explained which whites discriminated, whereas resentment did not. In study 2, white third-party observers evaluated intergroup interactions in the Ultimatum Game, and explicit prejudice explained racially biased fairness evaluations, but resentment did not. This demonstrates that resentment and prejudice are distinct constructs and that explicit prejudice has clear behavioral implications. We also find that explicit prejudice is widespread among white Americans and significantly less partisan than resentment.

Political scientists regularly measure anti-Black prejudice in the survey context using racial resentment, a scale created from four survey items about "Blacks" as a group (e.g., "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve"). Proponents of the scale argue that it captures a blend of anti-Black animus and traditional moral values associated with social conservatism and Republican Party identification (Kinder and Sears 1981). In one view, overt prejudice—based in beliefs about Black inferiority—declined after the civil rights movement, only to be replaced by this "new form of racial prejudice" (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 97–98). Resentment powerfully predicts a host of attitudes about public policy, including race-based policies like affirmative action, as well as evaluations of political candidates (Pasek et al. 2009; but see Zigerell 2018). But is resentment accurately characterized as a measure of racial prejudice grounded in anti-Black animus?

One view is that the robust associations between resentment and racial policy preferences provide strong evidence of the survey instrument's validity as a measure of anti-Black prejudice (Henry and Sears 2002) and that resentful whites oppose government policies designed to ameliorate racial inequality precisely because they benefit Black individuals (Rabinowitz et al. 2009). But others have noted these correlations could arise for multiple reasons, including social conservatism (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986), generic opposition to group-targeted policy (Feldman and Huddy 2005), individual differences in political sophistication (Gomez and Wilson 2006), and differences in beliefs about the role that structural versus individual factors play in explaining racial inequality (Kam and Burge 2018).

Adjudicating among these various perspectives is one of the longest running controversies in the study of race and politics, but it has proved especially difficult to resolve with regression analyses of survey data (Brown et al. 2009). In part, this is

because even if different survey measures of racial attitudes predict racial policy preferences, it is not evidence they do so for the same reason (Carmines, Sniderman, and Easter 2011). These associations are therefore theoretically ambiguous. An alternative approach to understanding the meaning of explicit (survey-based) measures of anti-Black prejudice is to move beyond their associations with political attitudes and policy preferences and instead examine their association with inter-group behavior and anti-Black discrimination. Here we use experimental designs that directly examine whether indirect (racial resentment) and direct (explicit prejudice) measures of anti-Black prejudice predict a willingness to engage in anti-Black discrimination and racial bias in intergroup resource allocations.

First, we use a nonanonymous version of the Ultimatum Game (UG) that randomizes the skin color of interaction partners, along with monetary stakes, to obtain behavioral measures of anti-Black discrimination. In the UG, rational self-interest favors accepting any positive amount, but if responders believe the proposer has offered too little, they may sacrifice their own payoff in order to punish the proposer for violating a fairness norm (Bowles 2009, chap. 3). Racial discrimination occurs when a white individual rejects an offer from a Black individual that would be accepted if offered by a white indi-vidual. In a second study, we use an experimental design that leverages the random assignment of monetary stakes and the skin color of interaction partners in the UG to examine how white third-party observers judge the fairness of intergroup resource allocations. We use these experiments to assess the explanatory power of racial resentment and explicit prejudice in explaining heterogeneity in anti-Black discrimination and third-party evaluations of intergroup behavior.

Although researchers may disagree about whether anti-Black animus drives resentful whites' opposition to affirmative action, such ambiguities are not present in the experimental environment we use. Instead, we obtain direct behavioral ev-idence about a willingness to discriminate on the basis of race in a context where many of the other explanations for racial policy preferences—like differences in beliefs about the origins of economic inequality or attitudes about whether race-based policies are procedurally fair, are not in play. The experimental setting therefore provides clearer evidence about potential mechanisms underlying the correlation between racial re-sentment and racial policy attitudes. We ask two questions. First, does resentment predict a willingness to engage in costly punishment of Black individuals for norm violations that would be tolerated if they were white? Second, are these racially biased standards also imposed on Black individuals by third-party observers of intergroup interactions? If survey measures of resentment predict an individual's willingness to engage in

racial discrimination in the UG and to impose higher stan-dards on Black behavior as a third-party observer, then it is appropriate to interpret the correlation between resentment and opposition to policies that advantage Blacks as grounded, at least in part, in a desire to hold Black individuals to a higher standard and punish them for behavior that would be tolerated if they were white. If not, then resentment is not prognostic of racial discrimination in contexts that involve distributing re-sources between Black and white individuals.

In addition to advancing an understanding of the meaning of racial resentment, we use our design to examine the con-temporary importance of explicit prejudice, based in beliefs about the group-level inferiority of Blacks relative to whites. Although a more direct measure of anti-Black prejudice than resentment, these survey instruments have been used less fre-quently in academic work in the last three decades (Huddy and Feldman 2009). In part, this is because of concerns that more explicit measures activate social image concerns that encour-age individuals to censor their true levels of racial prejudice (Hutchings and Valentino 2004), but this apprehension seems less relevant today given the advent of anonymous online surveys (Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008). In light of the emergence of resentment as a new form of anti-Black prejudice, is explicit prejudice still politically relevant? Do resentment and this more "overt" form of prejudice have similar implications?

Identifying the predictors of anti-Black discrimination and bias against Black individuals is also important in its own right for understanding politics and intergroup relations more gen-erally. For example, does resentment explain why Black indi-viduals are punished more harshly than whites who commit similar crimes? In the political arena, those who prefer that Blacks get less than whites may discriminate against minority candidates or punish them for behaviors that would go un-punished if the candidate were white. For example, would re-sentful whites tolerate Black candidates "going negative" and having extramarital affairs? Moreover, does the strong associ-ation between partisanship and resentment imply that white Republicans are more prone to racial discrimination than white Democrats?

This article offers several empirical contributions relevant to theory building in the measurement of racial prejudice. First, we document both widespread resentment and explicit preju-dice among whites. Approximately 59% of white respondents in our national survey sample were classified as prejudiced and about 52% were resentful (correlation 0.26), and although Republicans were 40 percentage points more likely to be re-sentful than Democrats, they were only 18 percentage points more likely to be explicitly prejudiced. Second, we identify costly discrimination against Black (vs. white) proposers in the UG, with offers by Blacks more likely to be rejected by whites.

We find similar bias when whites act as third-party observers to UG interactions, where offers from Blacks to whites are perceived as uniquely unfair. Third, we find that survey measures of explicit prejudice, but not racial resentment, predict which whites engage in costly discrimination and racially biased fairness evaluations. That resentment does not predict a willingness to engage in individual-level discrimination suggests it is not a measure of racial animus against Black individuals. By contrast, explicit prejudice, which is widespread among both Democrats and Republicans, reliably predicts anti-Black discrimination and likely has broader implications for intergroup relations.

STUDY 1: RACIAL PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATORY BEHAVIOR

Study 1 examines the link between anti-Black prejudice and discrimination using a nonanonymous version of the UG. In this game, two players are offered a chance to earn a certain allocation of money. One player, called the "proposer," decides how to split the allocation with another player, called the "responder." The responder faces a binary decision: accept or reject the money offered by the proposer. For example, if a proposer offers 25 cents out of $1.00 and the responder accepts, the responder receives 25 cents and the proposer receives 75 cents. However, if the responder rejects this offer, both receive nothing. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the responder is to accept any positive offer, but responders frequently reject offers below 20% of the initial endowment, consistent with a social preference for punishing proposers who make unfair offers (Henrich et al. 2001).

For this study, we recruited 738 white workers from Amazon's Mechanical Turk marketplace (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012) to play 30 rounds of the UG with 30 unique male proposers, each a randomly selected subset of 160 male actors from a research database of neutral faces used in prior studies of racial discrimination (Kubota et al. 2013). Fifteen of the proposers were white, 10 were Black, and 5 were of other races. The Black and white faces were readily identified by race. Subjects were exposed to the same set of 30 actors, presented in random order, with a randomly drawn discrete offer amount (out of an initial endowment of $1.00) between $0.00 and $0.60. Racial resentment was measured using the four-item battery of questions asked on various waves of the American National Election Studies survey since 1986. Responses for each subject are scaled to create a binary Racial Resentment Indicator (RRI) via the commonly used transformation that classifies prejudiced whites as those who indicate a level of racial resentment above the (neutral) midpoint (e.g., Pasek et al. 2009). Following conceptions of prejudice in social psychology, we measured explicit prejudice using individuals' beliefs about group-level differences between Blacks and whites (Huddy

and Feldman 2009).[1] Subjects were asked to rate "Whites," "Blacks," "Hispanics," and "Asians" using a sliding seven-point scale for each of four traits: trustworthiness, violence, work ethic, and intelligence (see fig. S3; figs. S1–S9 available online). We take the Black-white difference for each trait scored so that values above zero indicate a belief in group-level Black inferiority (e.g., Blacks are lazier than whites) and create a binary Explicit Prejudice Indicator (EPI) that classifies "prejudiced whites" as those who score higher than zero when the Black-white differences on all traits are averaged. For example, if a subject ranked "Blacks" as more violent than "Whites" but indicates the two races are indistinguishable on other traits, then this person is coded as endorsing the group-level inferiority of Blacks. The appendix (available online) presents associations between explicit prejudice and racial resentment (sec. 1) and additional design details with robustness checks for alternative measurement and estimation approaches (sec. 2).

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

We focus attention on 25 rounds of play involving either Black or white proposers (738 white subjects × 25 rounds = 18,450 subject rounds). Of these offers, 69% were accepted and the likelihood of acceptance increased with offer amount, but whites were less likely to accept offers when the proposer was Black rather than white (see fig. S1). We first regress decisions (coded accept = 1, reject = 0) on an indicator for Black proposer (Black = 1, white = 0), offer amount, and round of play (M1.1). In a second model (M1.2), we include an interaction between resentment and Black proposer (Black proposer × RRI), and in a third model (M1.3) we include an interaction between explicit prejudice and the Black proposer (Black proposer × EPI). Finally, in a fourth model (M1.4) we include both interactions in the same specification. Each interaction term corresponds to a difference in differences (DiD) in acceptance probabilities for a particular subgroup. For example, the DiD estimate from M1.2 is the difference between resentful and nonresentful participants in the probability of accepting an offer from a Black rather than a white proposer. A negative DiD estimate would mean that the "Black proposer effect" reduced the likelihood of acceptance more for resentful whites than for nonresentful whites. Results are summarized in figure 1, which plots point estimates and confidence intervals for the overall effect of the Black proposer (M1.1), as well as the interaction terms in M1.2–M1.4.

The first estimate, a 1.3 percentage point decrease ($p < .01$) in the probability of acceptance, shows that, on average, white

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1. Prejudice is a negative evaluation of another person based on group membership, whereas discrimination is a negative behavior toward that person (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986).

Figure 1. Effect of Black proposer (BP) on likelihood of offer acceptance in study 1. Estimate for main effect from ordinary least squares regression of offer acceptance on indicator for BP in model 1.1. Difference-in-differences estimate for resentful whites from BP × RRI interaction in model 1.2. Difference-in-differences estimate for prejudiced whites from BP × EPI interaction in model 1.3. Model 1.4 estimates both interactions simultaneously. All regression models include fixed effects for offer amount and round. Thick horizontal lines are 90% confidence intervals and thin horizontal lines are 95% confidence intervals, estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the subject level. Regression output is presented in tabular form in table S1.1.

responders engaged in anti-Black discrimination by rejecting offers they would otherwise accept if the proposer was white (M1.1). To put this in perspective, 96% of $.40 offers are accepted, while 99% of equitable ($.50) offers are accepted. The 1.3 point Black proposer effect is about one-third of this 3 point difference. The second estimate—a DiD of 0 percentage points (M1.2, $p = .99$)—shows that resentful whites (43% of the sample) were no more likely to engage in anti-Black discrimination than nonresentful whites. The third estimate—a DiD of approximately −2 percentage points (M1.3, $p = .03$)—shows that prejudiced whites (42% of the sample) were significantly more likely to engage in anti-Black discrimination than non-prejudiced whites. Finally, the corresponding estimates from M1.4 confirm these inferences are unchanged in a model that includes both interactions simultaneously (180/738, or 24%, of subjects were classified as both prejudiced and resentful). Overall, racial resentment did not predict anti-Black discrimination in any of the estimation approaches, but the explicit prejudice measure reliably distinguished between white subjects who engaged in anti-Black discrimination and those who did not.

STUDY 2: RACIAL PREJUDICE AND THIRD-PARTY EVALUATIONS OF INTERGROUP INEQUALITY

The results from study 1 establish two important facts. First, whites were significantly less likely to accept offers from Black

than white proposers in the UG. This is a costly behavioral measure of racial discrimination that cannot be explained by offer amount or round of play. Second, explicit prejudice predicts which whites discriminate and racial resentment does not. In study 2, we examine how whites perceive the fairness of proposed resource allocations between Black and white individuals using an experiment in which whites acted as third-party evaluators of UG interactions. In this experiment, the proposer's offer and the skin color of the proposer and responder were all randomly assigned. We can therefore identify the joint effects of proposer and responder race on the perceived fairness of resource allocations. If prejudiced whites impose uniquely higher standards on Black proposers' behavior toward white responders, as suggested by the results from study 1, then interactions between Black proposers and white responders should be viewed as less fair than interactions between white proposers and white responders. Further, if prejudiced whites disproportionately impose this fairness standard in intergroup interactions where a Black, rather than white, proposer makes the initial resource allocation proposal, then they should evaluate offers from Black proposers to white responders as less fair than offers from white proposers to Black responders.

This experiment was administered in the second wave of a nationally representative panel survey of white Americans. Wave 1 measured demographics and the same measures of racial resentment and explicit prejudice used in study 1. Approximately 10 days later, all subjects from wave 1 ($N = 1,715$) were invited to wave 2 and completed ($N = 1,029$) a putatively unrelated study on decision-making. Subjects were shown 41 rounds of play in the UG and evaluated the fairness of the proposer's offer and the likelihood the responder accepted, both on 0–100 scales (see fig. S8). The racial pairs, 82 unique male faces sampled without replacement from the database used in study 1, were randomly assigned across the 41 unique UG rounds, along with the proposer's offer amount. Appendix section 3 provides additional details about the design of study 2 along with robustness checks for alternative measurement and estimation approaches.

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

We restrict attention to 741 white evaluators who passed a comprehension test and completed at least 75% of the evaluations assigned to them, focusing on the 36 rounds of UG play involving only Black and white proposers and responders (741×36 rounds = 26,676 potential observations). We find a strong association between the perceived fairness of an offer and the predicted likelihood it was accepted (correlation 0.86). White evaluators viewed proposed intergroup resource allocations, as well as interactions between two Black individuals,

as systematically less fair than interactions between two whites (see fig. S2).

We estimate the effect of proposer and responder race on the perceived fairness of the proposer's offer with regression analyses that predict evaluations as a function of offer amount, round of play, and the proposer responder (PR) pair: Black proposer white responder (BW), Black proposer Black responder (BB), white proposer Black responder (WB), and the omitted reference category white proposer white responder (WW). To obtain an estimate of main effects, we regress perceived fairness on the PR pairs, with fixed effects for offer amount and round of play (M2.1). In a second model (M2.2) we include interactions between resentment and the PR pairs (PR × RRI), in a third model (M2.3) we include an interaction between explicit prejudice and the PR pairs (PR × EPI), and in a fourth model (M2.4) we include both sets of interactions simultaneously.

Our primary contrasts of interest are BW minus WW, WB minus WW, and the intergroup difference BW minus WB. The first contrast identifies the effect that offers from Black, rather than white, proposers have on the perceived offer fairness to white responders. These allocations simulate the interactions from study 1. Negative estimates would indicate that Black proposers are held to a higher standard than white proposers when the responder is white. The second contrast estimates the effect that offers from white proposers to Black, rather than white, responders, have on perceived offer fairness. This tests whether all intergroup interactions involving Black players, regardless

of their role as a proposer or responder, are simply evaluated differently. Negative estimates here would indicate that white proposers are held to a higher standard when proposing allocations to Black, rather than white, responders. Finally, the intergroup difference (BW minus WB) corresponds to the difference across the first and second contrasts, and negative estimates here would indicate that offers from Black proposers to white responders are perceived as less fair than offers from white proposers to Black responders. As in study 1, the interaction terms correspond to DiD estimates across subgroups of individuals classified as resentful or prejudiced. Results are summarized in figure 2, which plots the point estimates and confidence intervals for each of the three comparisons across M2.1–M2.4.

The first set of estimates (M2.1) shows that offers from Black proposers to white responders were, all else equal, perceived as less fair (−0.65 points, $p = .01$) than offers from white proposers (BW − WW). Offers from white proposers to Black responders were also perceived to be less fair (−1.15 points, $p < .01$) than offers to white responders (WB − WW). Finally, the intergroup difference (BW − WB) shows that, on average, offers from Black proposers to white responders were rated as more fair than offers from white proposers to Black responders (0.50 points, $p = .05$). Overall, intergroup interactions were therefore rated less fair than interactions between whites, but in intergroup interactions, the behavior of Black proposers was seen as more fair than the behavior of white proposers.


Figure 2. Effect of intergroup pairs on third-party fairness evaluations in study 2. Estimates for main effect from model 2.1, ordinary least squares regression of perceived fairness of proposer's offer on randomly assigned proposer responder (PR) interaction: BW, WB, BW, with WW interaction as the reference category. Difference-in-differences estimate for resentful whites from PR × RRI interactions in model 2.2. Difference-in-differences estimate for prejudiced whites from PR × EPI interactions in model 2.3. Model 2.4 estimates both interactions simultaneously. The Intergroup Difference (BW-WB) = (BW-WW) − (WB-WW) is calculated using linear combinations of regression coefficients. All regression models include fixed effects for offer amount and round. Thick horizontal lines are 90% confidence intervals and thin horizontal lines are 95% confidence intervals, estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the subject level. Point estimates and standard errors are presented in tabular form in table S2.1.

The second set of estimates (M2.2) corresponds to the differences in fairness evaluations given by resentful versus nonresentful whites across all three contrasts. First, we find a BW − WW DiD of −0.67 points ($p = .16$), which shows that resentful and nonresentful whites imposed a similar fairness standard on Black and white proposers' offers to white responders. The same was true for evaluations of offers from white proposers to Black rather than white responders (WB − WW = −0.49, $p = .33$). Finally, the intergroup difference of −0.18 (BW − WB, $p = .73$) shows that resentful whites did not rate intergroup offers from white proposers differently than intergroup offers from Black proposers, just as in study 1 they did not discriminate against Black proposers.

The third set of estimates (M2.3) corresponds to differences in fairness evaluations given by prejudiced versus nonprejudiced whites across the three contrasts. First, the BW − WW DiD of −1.52 points ($p < .01$) shows that, compared to nonprejudiced whites, prejudiced whites imposed a higher fairness standard on offers from Black, rather than white, proposers when the responder was white. Second, the DiD of −0.14 points ($p = .78$) for offers from white proposers to Black, rather than white, responders (WB − WW) demonstrates that prejudiced and nonprejudiced whites rated these interactions similarly. Finally, relative to nonprejudiced whites, prejudiced whites perceived offers from Black proposers to white responders as −1.38 points (BW − WB, $p = .01$) less fair than offers from Black proposers to white responders. Unlike resentful whites, therefore, prejudiced whites rated intergroup offers from Black proposers as less fair than intergroup offers from white proposers, just as in study 1 they discriminated against Black proposers. The corresponding estimates from M2.4 confirm these inferences are unchanged in a model that includes both EPI and RRI interactions simultaneously.

Consistent with the individual-level predictors of anti-Black discrimination observed in study 1, we find that explicit prejudice, but not racial resentment, reliably distinguished which whites imposed racially biased fairness standards on Black individuals. Together, these results suggest that prejudiced whites engage in racially biased costly punishment (study 1) because they perceive offers from Black proposers to be less fair than equivalent offers from white proposers to white responders (study 2).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Racial resentment, an important predictor of race-related policy attitudes, is widely used as an indirect measure of anti-Black prejudice, but the validity of this characterization is one of the most contested issues in the study of race and politics. One interpretation is that resentful whites oppose policies designed to ameliorate racial inequality precisely be-

cause they are perceived to unfairly benefit Black individuals. We used the UG to examine whether resentment explains anti-Black discrimination and racially biased fairness standards in a generic resource allocation context. We find that whites do engage in anti-Black discrimination but that resentment does not predict this behavior, nor does it predict how whites evaluate the fairness of intergroup resource allocations. Resentment is therefore an unreliable indicator of a preference for discrimination and racial bias in contexts in which the distribution of resources between Black and white individuals is detached from the procedures that determine these allocations. We instead find that explicit prejudice—a more direct measure of racial animus—reliably identifies whites who will discriminate against Black individuals for failing to meet the higher standards imposed on them, even when doing so is economically costly.

We also find that a majority of white Americans are willing to state their explicit prejudice in the anonymous survey context by endorsing the group-level inferiority of Blacks relative to whites. As an indicator of racial prejudice, this direct measure is significantly less partisan than resentment. In study 2, for example, Republicans were 40 percentage points more likely to be resentful than Democrats (72% vs. 33%) but only 18 percentage points more likely to be explicitly prejudiced (69% vs. 51%). Although one interpretation of the partisan difference in resentment is that the Democratic identity has a palliative effect on racial animus (Engelhardt 2019), this indirect measure grossly underestimates levels of racial prejudice among white Democrats. We find that, despite substantial differences in racial resentment, white Republicans are no more likely to discriminate against Black individuals than are white Democrats. These results are consistent with a growing body of research that demonstrates direct questioning is the best way to measure racial attitudes in the survey context (e.g., Axt 2018).

There are important potential limitations of the studies described here. First, we do not experimentally manipulate explicit prejudice or racial resentment and, as with all prior research using these survey measures, therefore cannot identify the casual effects these explicit attitudes have on intergroup behavior. However, the explicit measure of prejudice we use is distinct from a generic form of out-group animosity, which we find does not predict anti-Black discrimination in the UG (see table S1.11; tables S1.1–S1.13 and S2.1–S2.4 available online). We also assume the experiments used here provide a reliable context for studying an individual's willingness to engage in racial discrimination. Concerns about whether some subjects discerned the purpose of study 1 and then controlled their impulse to discriminate are reasonable. If true, then the results reported here may underestimate whites' willingness to

discriminate. If these social image concerns are higher among resentful individuals, this could explain why they did not engage in anti-Black discrimination. Additional analyses reported in the appendix show that increased time pressure did not affect decision-making in the UG (table S1.12) and that subjects behaved similarly across time, regardless of educational background (table S1.13). This suggests the observed discrimination was not affected by decision constraints or learning effects, but caution about extrapolation beyond the controlled experimental environment is always warranted.

Finally, we have shown that explicit prejudice, and not resentment, predicts discrimination and racial bias in a context that abstracts away from the policy process and instead focuses on resource distributions between Black and white individuals. Whether resentment predicts whites' willingness to impose comparatively higher standards on the behavior of Black individuals thorough some policy process is contested (see DeSante 2013; Zigerell 2015), but we find clear evidence that explicit prejudice explains differences in perceptions of the fairness of proposed intergroup resource allocations. We cannot distinguish among other interpretations of resentment that focus on its link to intergroup conflict over the procedural fairness of resource allocations between groups, but this is a clear avenue for future research. Feldman and Huddy (2005), for example, have shown that resentment is a predictor of opposition to any race-targeted policy, regardless of beneficiary race, and Kam and Burge (2018) show that resentment distinguishes between individuals who make individual versus structural attributions when reasoning about the social and economic status of Black individuals. Are resentful whites supportive of structural solutions to racial inequality if policies that disproportionately benefit Black individuals do so without explicitly considering race? Similarly, if it becomes known that Black individuals disproportionately benefit from procedurally race-neutral policies, do prejudiced individuals then oppose those policies? Behavioral experiments may be a superior alternative to regression analyses of opinion surveys for disentangling the implications that different racial attitudes have for discrimination and intergroup conflict over distributive and procedural fairness.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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