

## Online Appendix for “Are Voting Norms Conditional?”

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## 1. Question Wording for Voting Norms Survey Experiments

*Instructions: In Study 1, respondents completed EITHER Vignette 1 OR 2 AND EITHER Vignette 3 OR 4. Vignette 4 is not included as part of this manuscript. In Study 2, respondents completed EITHER Vignette 1 OR 2 AND all respondents completed Vignette 3.*

*Also, randomize which other behaviors appear in the vignettes.*

Never tip waiters and waitresses more than 10% / always tip waiters and waitresses more than 10%

Recycle / do not recycle

Pay their taxes on time / pay their taxes late

Are a smoker / don't smoke

Are obese / keep in shape

Are a doctor / personal injury lawyer

Are messy / are organized

Donate 5% of their income to charity / do not donate any of their income to charity

### ***Vignette 1: Battleground Status***

[Suppose you just met someone / Now imagine you met a **different** person] and learned the following information about them: They [are a smoker / don't smoke]

[, only vote in presidential elections when the outcome in their state is likely to determine the national election outcome /

, don't vote in presidential elections, even when the outcome in their state is likely to determine the national election outcome /

, vote in presidential elections, even when the outcome in their state is unlikely to determine the national election outcome /

, don't vote in presidential elections when the outcome in their state is unlikely to determine the national election outcome]

and [pay their taxes on time / pay their taxes late].

### ***Vignette 2: Election Closeness***

[Suppose you just met someone / Now imagine you met a **different** person] and learned the following information about them: They [are a smoker / don't smoke]

[, vote both when an election is expected to be close and when an election is not expected to be close /

, vote when an election is expected to be close, but don't vote when an election is not expected to be close /

, don't vote both when an election is expected to be close or when an election is not expected to be close]

and [pay their taxes on time / pay their taxes late].

### ***Vignette 3: Peer Behavior***

[Suppose you just met someone / Now imagine you met a **different** person] and learned the following information about them: They [are a smoker / don't smoke]

[, vote when most of the people they know are going to vote /

, don't vote even when most of the people they know are going to vote /

, don't vote when most of the people they know are not going to vote /

, vote even when most of the people they know are not going to vote]

and [pay their taxes on time / pay their taxes late].

### ***Vignette 4: Election Type***

[Suppose you just met someone / Now imagine you met a **different** person] and learned the following information about them: They [are a smoker / don't smoke]

[, always vote in presidential elections, but never vote in midterm congressional elections /

, always vote in both presidential elections and midterm congressional elections /

, never vote in either presidential elections or midterm congressional elections / and [pay their taxes on time/pay their taxes late].

To what extent would you agree with each of the following statements?

**Columns:**

- 1 Strongly agree
- 2 Agree
- 3 Somewhat agree
- 4 Neither agree nor disagree
- 5 Somewhat disagree
- 6 Disagree
- 7 Strongly disagree

**Rows:**

- 1 My overall impression of this person is positive.
- 2 I think this person is responsible.
- 3 I respect this person.
- 4 I think this person is a good citizen. [Study 2 only]

## 2. Details about Subject Recruitment and Sample Restrictions

Subjects were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) interface. The first (Study 1) was fielded in April 2011; the second (Study 2) was fielded in August 2016. In each study, participants were paid 50 cents for completing the survey. The MTurk population is a convenience sample that is more representative than student samples, but is not wholly representative of the U.S. population (Berkinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; also see Huff and Tingley 2015; Krupnikov and Levine 2014; Mullinix et al. 2015).

### *Subject Recruitment*

The MTurk requests read: “This survey will ask you a series of questions about you and your feelings about [Study 1: a variety of topics; Study 2: current events and politics]. [Study 2: To participate in the study, you must be at least 18 years old. The survey is here: [URL]. Once you finish the survey you will be provided with a code. To get paid, please enter the code below and click “Submit”. **DO NOT CLOSE THIS WINDOW WHILE YOU ARE TAKING THE SURVEY. Payment is auto-approved in [Study 1: 5 days; Study 2: 2 days].**”

### *Sample Restrictions*

For each experiment we restrict our analysis to respondents who evaluated the target individual and provided usable responses to the items used to test for balance across experimental conditions. For each experiment we estimated a multinomial logit model predicting treatment assignment with respondent gender, education, race (white), reported interest in politics, party identification, and age. These models did not indicate significant imbalances on these measures across treatment conditions (tests of joint significance of models (Study 1; Study 2): *Battleground Status* ( $p=0.236$ ;  $p=0.098$ ); *Election Closeness* ( $p=0.638$ ;  $p=0.530$ ); *Peer Behavior* ( $p=.542$ ;  $p=0.451$ )). Respondents who did not provide responses to these questions or who did not rate the target (fewer than 9% of respondents in all experiments) are excluded from the models we report in the text. Our results are robust to the inclusion of respondents who

did not provide all demographic information (see Online Appendix Table A3). For each experiment, less than 1.3% of respondents provided demographic information but failed to rate the target. Voting behavior treatments did not significantly predict failure to rate the target in any experiment ( $p > .10$  for all tests). Analysis retaining respondents who did not respond to all items used in the balance tests and setting missing target evaluations to the sample mean (within experiment) also yields substantive similar conclusions (see Online Appendix Table A4).

### 3. Additional References

- Berinsky, Adam J., Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. "Using Mechanical Turk as a Subject Recruitment Tool for Experimental Research." *Political Analysis* 20: 351-368.
- Huff, Connor, and Dustin Tingley. 2015. "Who Are These People?" *Research & Politics* 2: 1-12.
- Krupnikov, Yanna and Adam Seth Levine. 2014. "Cross-Sample Comparisons and External Validity." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 1: 59-80.
- Mullinix, Kevin J., Thomas J. Leeper, James N. Druckman, and Jeremy Freese. 2015. "The Generalizability of Survey Experiments." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 2: 109-138.

#### 4. Supplementary Tables

**Table A1: Descriptive Characteristics of Samples**

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	All		Battleground Status		Election Closeness		Peer Behavior	
	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2
Evaluation of Target	0.255 [1.4563]	0.238 [1.4359]	0.101 [1.4693]	0.256 [1.4302]	0.222 [1.4595]	0.332 [1.3522]	0.195 [1.4739]	0.227 [1.4176]
White = 1	0.796 [.4033]	0.787 [.4095]	0.773 [.4196]	0.806 [.3955]	0.818 [.3861]	0.769 [.4216]	0.768 [.4224]	0.787 [.4094]
Black = 1	0.073 [.261]	0.085 [.2789]	0.079 [.2692]	0.076 [.2648]	0.069 [.2532]	0.092 [.2886]	0.081 [.2738]	0.086 [.2799]
Hispanic = 1	0.041 [.199]	0.061 [.24]	0.060 [.2384]	0.049 [.2167]	0.022 [.1476]	0.074 [.2619]	0.044 [.205]	0.061 [.2393]
Other race=1	0.106 [.3075]	0.096 [.2952]	0.101 [.3011]	0.097 [.296]	0.111 [.3146]	0.097 [.296]	0.127 [.3337]	0.096 [.295]
Age (in years)	33.015 [12.7678]	29.962 [11.9224]	32.561 [12.515]	29.828 [11.6232]	33.507 [13.0241]	30.130 [12.2004]	32.674 [12.5364]	30.017 [11.9323]
Female=1	0.568 [.4955]	0.545 [.4982]	0.551 [.4979]	0.549 [.498]	0.588 [.4927]	0.541 [.4988]	0.560 [.497]	0.545 [.4982]
Education (1=No HS; 6=post-grad)	4.016 [1.3221]	4.160 [1.2559]	4.040 [1.3146]	4.195 [1.2622]	4.000 [1.3271]	4.134 [1.2513]	4.013 [1.3537]	4.165 [1.2554]
Party ID (-3=S. Dem; 3=S. Rep)	-0.581 [1.9598]	-0.608 [2.0175]	-0.501 [1.9594]	-0.558 [2.0574]	-0.663 [1.9584]	-0.655 [1.978]	-0.551 [1.9548]	-0.610 [2.0157]
Observations	994	1142	497	568	495	568	479	1133

Note: Cell entries are means with standard deviations in brackets.

**Table A2: Regression Models Used to Calculate Estimated Treatment Effects**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Battleground Status		Election Closeness		Peer Behavior	
	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2
Vote When State Likely to Determine Outcome	0.339 [0.147]*	0.408 [0.128]**				
Vote, Even When State Unlikely to Determine Outcome	1.180 [0.166]**	1.167 [0.142]**				
Only Vote When Expected to be Close			0.013 [0.131]	0.320 [0.122]**		
Vote Regardless of Whether Close or Not Close			0.926 [0.136]**	0.866 [0.120]**		
Don't Vote When Most of the People they Know are Not Going To Vote					-0.086 [0.152]	0.008 [0.104]
Vote When Most of the People they Know are Going to Vote					0.405 [0.166]*	0.616 [0.099]**
Vote Even When Most of the People They Know are Not Going To Vote					1.042 [0.157]**	0.957 [0.099]**
Always Tip Waiters And Waitresses More Than 10%	0.163 [0.257]	-0.041 [0.206]	0.316 [0.261]	-0.026 [0.194]	-0.074 [0.212]	0.013 [0.146]
Never Tip Waiters And Waitresses More Than 10%	-0.935 [0.229]**	-1.624 [0.182]**	-0.848 [0.238]**	-1.225 [0.220]**	-1.181 [0.233]**	-1.516 [0.160]**
Are A Doctor	-0.014 [0.228]	-0.291 [0.199]	0.145 [0.243]	-0.127 [0.200]	-0.215 [0.244]	-0.164 [0.151]
Are A Personal Injury Lawyer	-0.410 [0.246]	-0.611 [0.205]**	-0.668 [0.226]**	-0.669 [0.201]**	-0.962 [0.229]**	-0.740 [0.148]**
Are A Non-Smoker	-0.024 [0.219]	-0.205 [0.209]	-0.251 [0.239]	-0.131 [0.190]	0.012 [0.236]	-0.117 [0.140]
Are A Smoker	-0.882 [0.214]**	-0.940 [0.206]**	-1.187 [0.225]**	-0.922 [0.195]**	-0.785 [0.227]**	-0.914 [0.146]**
Are Messy	-0.621 [0.245]*	-1.329 [0.224]**	-0.898 [0.219]**	-0.983 [0.180]**	-0.989 [0.254]**	-0.972 [0.151]**
Are Organized	-0.250 [0.222]	-0.610 [0.186]**	-0.061 [0.233]	-0.122 [0.211]	-0.207 [0.238]	-0.427 [0.155]**
Are Obese	-0.840 [0.232]**	-0.849 [0.223]**	-1.313 [0.232]**	-0.852 [0.198]**	-0.802 [0.233]**	-0.884 [0.150]**
Keep In Shape	-0.385 [0.210]	-0.304 [0.178]	-0.443 [0.234]	-0.090 [0.198]	-0.081 [0.212]	-0.147 [0.148]
Do Not Donate Any Of Their Income To Charity	-0.840 [0.222]**	-0.965 [0.204]**	-1.124 [0.235]**	-0.608 [0.201]**	-1.254 [0.227]**	-0.947 [0.150]**
Donate 5% Of Their Income To Charity	0.453 [0.247]	-0.005 [0.175]	0.178 [0.231]	0.234 [0.203]	0.050 [0.237]	0.096 [0.157]
Pay Their Taxes Late	-1.069 [0.240]**	-1.183 [0.208]**	-0.939 [0.223]**	-1.120 [0.220]**	-1.550 [0.244]**	-1.203 [0.158]**
Pay Their Taxes On Time	0.001 [0.220]	-0.270 [0.198]	0.310 [0.217]	0.046 [0.202]	-0.120 [0.244]	0.111 [0.148]
Do Not Recycle	-0.890 [0.227]**	-0.996 [0.191]**	-1.044 [0.213]**	-0.976 [0.182]**	-1.164 [0.209]**	-0.982 [0.158]**
Constant	0.495 [0.332]	1.045 [0.280]**	0.969 [0.345]**	0.877 [0.277]**	1.038 [0.330]**	0.931 [0.233]**
Observations	497	568	495	568	479	1133
R-squared	0.290	0.346	0.364	0.306	0.342	0.336

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Excluded voting behavior categories: Battleground Status--"Don't vote in presidential elections, even when the outcome in their state is likely to determine the national election outcome"; Election Closeness--"Don't vote both when an election is expected to be close or when an election is not expected to be close"; Peer Behavior--"Don't vote even when most of the people they know are going to vote." Excluded category for other characteristics is "Recycles" across all models. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

**Table A3: Regression Models Including Respondents Without Full Demographic Information**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Battleground Status		Election Closeness		Peer Behavior	
	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2
Vote When State Likely to Determine Outcome	0.315 [0.142]*	0.361 [0.124]**				
Vote, Even When State Unlikely to Determine Outcome	1.174 [0.160]**	1.118 [0.137]**				
Only Vote When Expected to be Close			-0.017 [0.129]	0.328 [0.116]**		
Vote Regardless of Whether Close or Not Close			0.872 [0.131]**	0.901 [0.115]**		
Don't Vote When Most of the People they Know are Not Going To Vote					-0.093 [0.148]	-0.006 [0.099]
Vote When Most of the People they Know are Going to Vote					0.391 [0.159]*	0.593 [0.094]**
Vote Even When Most of the People They Know are Not Going To Vote					1.034 [0.154]**	0.926 [0.095]**
Always Tip Waiters And Waitresses More Than 10%	0.204 [0.242]	-0.196 [0.204]	0.225 [0.258]	-0.057 [0.185]	-0.081 [0.208]	0.026 [0.141]
Never Tip Waiters And Waitresses More Than 10%	-0.925 [0.222]**	-1.592 [0.181]**	-0.973 [0.231]**	-1.281 [0.206]**	-1.192 [0.228]**	-1.472 [0.150]**
Are A Doctor	0.020 [0.219]	-0.324 [0.195]	0.006 [0.239]	-0.139 [0.196]	-0.220 [0.243]	-0.140 [0.145]
Are A Personal Injury Lawyer	-0.399 [0.235]	-0.586 [0.208]**	-0.803 [0.222]**	-0.720 [0.187]**	-0.957 [0.227]**	-0.741 [0.142]**
Are A Non-Smoker	-0.018 [0.212]	-0.213 [0.204]	-0.265 [0.231]	-0.198 [0.179]	-0.025 [0.234]	-0.091 [0.133]
Are A Smoker	-0.911 [0.208]**	-0.997 [0.203]**	-1.255 [0.219]**	-0.976 [0.179]**	-0.783 [0.220]**	-0.929 [0.139]**
Are Messy	-0.612 [0.236]**	-1.357 [0.223]**	-0.946 [0.214]**	-0.928 [0.173]**	-1.027 [0.249]**	-0.964 [0.143]**
Are Organized	-0.268 [0.215]	-0.594 [0.186]**	-0.114 [0.228]	-0.183 [0.200]	-0.226 [0.230]	-0.379 [0.149]*
Are Obese	-0.852 [0.223]**	-0.904 [0.224]**	-1.436 [0.223]**	-0.891 [0.188]**	-0.786 [0.227]**	-0.875 [0.143]**
Keep In Shape	-0.353 [0.204]	-0.310 [0.176]	-0.528 [0.228]*	-0.102 [0.187]	-0.082 [0.206]	-0.154 [0.141]
Do Not Donate Any Of Their Income To Charity	-0.907 [0.218]**	-0.941 [0.198]**	-1.206 [0.229]**	-0.704 [0.188]**	-1.244 [0.220]**	-0.896 [0.142]**
Donate 5% Of Their Income To Charity	0.410 [0.239]	0.051 [0.175]	0.122 [0.230]	0.085 [0.201]	0.061 [0.230]	0.159 [0.149]
Pay Their Taxes Late	-1.015 [0.232]**	-1.245 [0.201]**	-1.093 [0.221]**	-1.107 [0.209]**	-1.528 [0.234]**	-1.172 [0.153]**
Pay Their Taxes On Time	0.062 [0.215]	-0.299 [0.194]	0.195 [0.212]	-0.010 [0.189]	-0.082 [0.232]	0.131 [0.142]
Do Not Recycle	-0.815 [0.220]**	-0.968 [0.186]**	-1.134 [0.207]**	-1.007 [0.175]**	-1.152 [0.203]**	-0.989 [0.150]**
Constant	0.492 [0.323]	1.123 [0.281]**	1.162 [0.336]**	0.929 [0.259]**	1.051 [0.324]**	0.914 [0.220]**
Observations	524	610	516	613	497	1218
R-squared	0.294	0.329	0.364	0.297	0.348	0.335

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Excluded voting behavior categories: Battleground Status--"Don't vote in presidential elections, even when the outcome in their state is likely to determine the national election outcome"; Election Closeness--"Don't vote both when an election is expected to be close or when an election is not expected to be close"; Peer Behavior--"Don't vote even when most of the people they know are going to vote." Excluded category for other characteristics is "Recycles" across all models. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

**Table A4: Regression Models Including Respondents Without Full Demographic Information (missing values on outcome set to mean)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Battleground Status		Election Closeness		Peer Behavior	
	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2	Study 1	Study 2
Vote When State Likely to Determine Outcome	0.312 [0.141]*	0.356 [0.123]**				
Vote, Even When State Unlikely to Determine Outcome	1.164 [0.159]**	1.118 [0.136]**				
Only Vote When Expected to be Close			-0.007 [0.126]	0.330 [0.115]**		
Vote Regardless of Whether Close or Not Close			0.871 [0.129]**	0.903 [0.115]**		
Don't Vote When Most of the People they Know are Not Going To Vote					-0.102 [0.146]	-0.009 [0.098]
Vote When Most of the People they Know are Going to Vote					0.387 [0.158]*	0.595 [0.093]**
Vote Even When Most of the People They Know are Not Going To Vote					1.032 [0.153]**	0.920 [0.094]**
Always Tip Waiters And Waitresses More Than 10%	0.197 [0.238]	-0.201 [0.200]	0.243 [0.253]	-0.056 [0.183]	-0.088 [0.202]	0.033 [0.139]
Are A Doctor	0.026 [0.217]	-0.324 [0.195]	0.005 [0.231]	-0.151 [0.193]	-0.205 [0.240]	-0.148 [0.143]
Are A Non-Smoker	-0.012 [0.211]	-0.213 [0.204]	-0.253 [0.229]	-0.198 [0.177]	-0.020 [0.227]	-0.088 [0.130]
Are A Personal Injury Lawyer	-0.393 [0.234]	-0.581 [0.206]**	-0.774 [0.220]**	-0.714 [0.187]**	-0.942 [0.223]**	-0.744 [0.140]**
Are A Smoker	-0.905 [0.207]**	-0.992 [0.201]**	-1.248 [0.217]**	-0.969 [0.178]**	-0.771 [0.216]**	-0.925 [0.138]**
Are Messy	-0.595 [0.233]*	-1.354 [0.222]**	-0.938 [0.212]**	-0.926 [0.171]**	-1.017 [0.245]**	-0.958 [0.141]**
Are Obese	-0.843 [0.222]**	-0.904 [0.224]**	-1.385 [0.217]**	-0.884 [0.187]**	-0.761 [0.224]**	-0.872 [0.141]**
Are Organized	-0.249 [0.212]	-0.600 [0.184]**	-0.117 [0.224]	-0.177 [0.199]	-0.237 [0.222]	-0.375 [0.147]*
Do Not Donate Any Of Their Income To Charity	-0.912 [0.215]**	-0.944 [0.196]**	-1.198 [0.227]**	-0.696 [0.187]**	-1.230 [0.217]**	-0.891 [0.139]**
Do Not Recycle	-0.806 [0.217]**	-0.970 [0.185]**	-1.123 [0.204]**	-0.998 [0.173]**	-1.128 [0.198]**	-0.976 [0.147]**
Donate 5% Of Their Income To Charity	0.418 [0.235]	0.042 [0.175]	0.132 [0.228]	0.093 [0.200]	0.061 [0.228]	0.152 [0.146]
Keep In Shape	-0.334 [0.201]	-0.310 [0.176]	-0.516 [0.226]*	-0.103 [0.185]	-0.068 [0.203]	-0.163 [0.139]
Never Tip Waiters And Waitresses More Than 10%	-0.918 [0.220]**	-1.593 [0.181]**	-0.962 [0.227]**	-1.276 [0.205]**	-1.180 [0.224]**	-1.453 [0.148]**
Pay Their Taxes Late	-0.998 [0.226]**	-1.245 [0.201]**	-1.083 [0.218]**	-1.101 [0.209]**	-1.517 [0.229]**	-1.166 [0.150]**
Pay Their Taxes On Time	0.061 [0.213]	-0.298 [0.194]	0.202 [0.209]	-0.003 [0.188]	-0.070 [0.229]	0.137 [0.140]
Constant	0.482 [0.320]	1.126 [0.281]**	1.138 [0.330]**	0.918 [0.256]**	1.032 [0.317]**	0.908 [0.216]**
Observations	530	615	524	618	503	1233
R-squared	0.293	0.328	0.361	0.296	0.345	0.332

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Excluded voting behavior categories: Battleground Status--"Don't vote in presidential elections, even when the outcome in their state is likely to determine the national election outcome"; Election Closeness--"Don't vote both when an election is expected to be close or when an election is not expected to be close"; Peer Behavior--"Don't vote even when most of the people they know are going to vote." Excluded category for other characteristics is "Recycles" across all models. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

**Table A5: Test for Variation in Treatment Effects Across Studies**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Battleground Status	Election Closeness	Peer Behavior
Vote When State Likely to Determine Outcome	0.339 [0.147]*		
Vote, Even When State Unlikely to Determine Outcome	1.180 [0.166]**		
Vote When State Likely to Determine Outcome x Study 2	0.069 [0.195]		
Vote, Even When State Unlikely to Determine Outcome x Study 2	-0.013 [0.218]		
Vote Regardless of Whether Close or Not Close		0.926 [0.136]**	
Only Vote When Expected to be Close		0.013 [0.131]	
Vote Regardless of Whether Close or Not Close x Study 2		-0.060 [0.182]	
Only Vote When Expected to be Close x Study 2		0.307 [0.179]	
Don't Vote When Most of the People they Know are Not Going To Vote			-0.086 [0.151]
Vote Even When Most of the People They Know are Not Going To Vote			1.042 [0.156]**
Vote When Most of the People they Know are Going to Vote			0.405 [0.164]*
Don't Vote When Most of the People they Know are Not Going To Vote x Study 2			0.094 [0.183]
Vote Even When Most of the People They Know are Not Going To Vote x Study 2			-0.086 [0.185]
Vote When Most of the People they Know are Going to Vote x Study 2			0.211 [0.192]
Study 2 (1=yes)	0.550 [0.435]	-0.092 [0.442]	-0.106 [0.402]
Constant	0.495 [0.332]	0.969 [0.344]**	1.038 [0.327]**
Observations	1065	1063	1612
R-squared	0.321	0.336	0.338
Joint Significance of Interactions (p-value)	0.876	0.070	0.423

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Excluded voting behavior categories: Battleground Status--"Don't vote in presidential elections, even when the outcome in their state is likely to determine the national election outcome"; Election Closeness--"Don't vote both when an election is expected to be close or when an election is not expected to be close"; Peer Behavior--"Don't vote even when most of the people they know are going to vote." Indicators for other target characteristics and interactions between those indicators and the Study 2 indicator are included in all models, but suppressed to save space. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%