Policy Shapes Partisan Identification:

How *Dobbs* made pre-existing abortion policy preferences relevant to partisanship

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Abstract: How do policy preferences shape partisan identification? Normally policy attitudes causing partisanship and partisanship causing policy attitudes are observationally equivalent. Using a large-scale multi-year panel (N=50,000) before and after the *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* decision in 2022 that overturned the *Roe v. Wade* line of precedents, we show that an exogenous increase in the policy relevance of abortion preferences causes Americans with misaligned abortion preferences to re-align their partisanship to match their abortion attitudes. This effect manifests among the 7% of partisans with misaligned attitudes and the 50% of independents with extreme abortion attitudes. Individuals who consider abortion more important and are more confident in their abortion opinions are particularly likely to change their partisan identifications post-*Dobbs*.

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What explains partisan identification in the mass public? On the one hand are perspectives that view partisanship as a social identity formed early in life that subsequently causes many other salient political outcomes like voting, issue positions, and evaluations of the other party (Campbell et al. 1960). On the other hand, are perspectives that view partisanship as a marker of evaluations of the parties, where such evaluations may be driven by issue positions, value commitments, and party performance while in office (Carsey & Layman 2006). Distinguishing between these two perspectives, particularly when focusing on the relative role of issue positions in explaining partisanship, is difficult because they are often observationally equivalent (Green 2013). For example, if one believes that partisanship shapes issue positions then one would expect individuals to have stable partisan orientations and adopt their party's issue positions. Alternatively, if one believes that issue positions shape partisanship, given that party positions on issues are generally stable, one would also predict that issue positions and partisanship would both be stable. In either account, issue positions should be tightly correlated with partisanship.

To disentangle this observational equivalence, we take advantage of an unexpected shift in the policy landscape in the United States. That shift was caused by the United States Supreme Court decision in *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, in which the Court overturned the precedent originating in *Roe v. Wade* that recognized a Constitutional protection for abortion rights. Following this decision the possibility of national abortion restrictions increased, and many states also adopted substantially more conservative abortion policies than had been in force since the *Roe v. Wade* decision. More generally, abortion policy preferences and party positions on abortion became policy consequential in a way that they had not previously been when *Roe* was in force. This provides a unique opportunity to understand whether individuals whose abortion policy preferences were at odds with their pre-*Dobbs* partisanship changed their partisanship in response to the change in the policy relevance of the parties' abortion positions.

Using unique large panel data that spans the period from before the *Dobbs* decision to after, we assess how partisan affiliations change following *Dobbs*. Prior to *Dobbs*, many individuals held abortion policy preferences at odds with their stated partisanship, likely for reasons apart from their partisanship (Killian & Wilcox 2008). Additionally, many political independents held extreme abortion policy preferences. The parties already held distinct policy positions on this issue, so if one expects individuals to bring their policy positions into alignment with their partisanship, this pattern is unexpected. Nonetheless, because of *Roe*, those party positions had limited policy consequences.

We assess whether individuals who were at odds with their party's now policy consequential positions changed their partisanship to resolve this misalignment. If issue positions are an important explanation for the choice of party affiliation, individuals may have changed their partisanship to address the newfound policy salience of abortion. In this perspective, for example, a pro-life Democrat who previously had little reason to believe either party could implement their preferred abortion policy now faced a salient tradeoff: They could shift to identifying as a Republican to pursue their abortion policy preferences or continue to align with the Democratic Party, either because partisanship is static or because they agree with the Democratic Party's other policy commitments.

We find clear evidence that the change in the abortion policy landscape has caused Americans to change their party identification. Comparing those with the most liberal abortion attitudes to

those with the most conservative attitudes, the average net move in the Democratic direction minus the average net move in the Republican direction is 5.7 points. This effect persists when controlling for demographic characteristics and preexisting issue positions on salient non-abortion issues that also shaped political conflict during this period. Supporting our interpretation of this effect as originating in a change in the salience of abortion policy opinions, we show that overturning *Roe* is associated with an increase in the perceived importance of abortion, particularly for those who hold more liberal policy positions. Additionally, contemporaneous evaluations of the importance of abortion and changes in the perceived importance of abortion predict greater change in partisanship to align it with preferred abortion policy positions.

Partisanship and Policy Positions

Partisanship's connection to policy attitudes has received considerable attention since the early inception of partisanship as a causal political variable (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960). While a full review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly discuss the most relevant evidence below (see Johnston 2006 and Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010 for more thorough reviews).

The most extreme views either consider partisan identification to be a longstanding attachment that comes causally prior to policy attitudes (e.g. it is early in Campbell et al. (1960)'s funnel of causality) or the sum of a running tally of attitudes towards the parties (Fiorina 1981), such as past performance while in office and policy positions taken by the party. These two views suggest two different causal connections between policy attitudes and partisanship that nonetheless both result in the observationally equivalent high correlation between voters' policy attitudes and their partisan identification.

Empirical work has generally tried to adjudicate between these two views, aiming to show either the effect of policy attitudes on partisanship, partisanship on policy attitudes, or both. For example, Lenz (2012) uses panel data to examine cases where parties take a position on a new issue and shows voters tend to adopt their party's position on that issue. In a survey experimental study, Barber and Pope (2019) find that cues from Donald Trump are enough to move public opinion among Republicans on some issues. Both studies are limited to studying issues where the parties have not staked out clear positions in the past because higher salience issues generally already display a tight correlation with stated partisanship.

Goren (2005) uses the 1992-1996 National Election Study (NES) panel and structural equation modelling to show partisan identification is more stable than ideological commitments to argue that partisanship constrains policy positions. Green et al. (2002) argue that partisanship is a social identity because voters tend to follow other social identities to sort into parties. Similarly, Achen and Bartels (2016) show that social group membership is more important for determining partisan alignment and realignment than the issue positions parties take. These studies, among many others, suggest that the correlation between issue positions and party positions is because voters adjust their attitudes to align with their partisan identities.

Other research suggests the causal link generally runs in the opposite direction – that policy attitudes cause partisan identification. A significant body of work has emphasized increased partisan sorting with liberal (conservative) Americans increasingly likely to identify with the

Democratic (Republican) party (Levandusky 2009). This work argues that voters use elite positions on issues to sort between the parties, choosing their partisanship to align with their issue and value commitments. Barber and Pope (2019) show that for important portions of the electorate – those with higher levels of political knowledge – partisan cues only move opinion when they align with partisan ideological expectations: cues from Donald Trump move opinions among highly knowledgeable Republicans only when Trump takes a conservative position. More generally, Fowler (2020) uses a combination of experimental and observational evidence to demonstrate that when partisanship and issue positions are put into conflict, individuals are more likely to choose candidates whose issue positions align with their own, undercutting the view that partisanship is causally prior to those issue positions.

Work that specifically focuses on the topic of abortion provides some of the key evidence about the interrelationship between issue positions and partisanship. Most of the existing evidence in this area uses data from two sources: the 1982-1997 Youth-Parent Socialization Study (YPSS) and the 1992-1996 NES panel (NESP) study. The NESP is the basis of Carsey and Layman (2006)'s analysis, which relies on a structural model in which partisanship and issue positions can both influence the other. They estimate that 1992 (1994) abortion positions are correlated with changes in partisanship between 1992 and 1994 (1994 and 1996). Their analysis relies on a small sample (N=597) and does not control for other factors that may explain this change, such as other issue positions or demographic factors (but see footnote 14). They show effects are larger among those who viewed abortion as more important and were better informed about the parties' positions.

Similarly, Killian and Wilcox (2008) use two types of panel data to examine how abortion attitudes measured on a 4-point scale predict changes in partisanship over time separately for Democrats and Republicans. Using various American National Election Study (ANES) panels, they find that in certain year comparisons, more pro-choice Democrats (pro-life Republicans) were more likely to switch parties, but that the same pattern does not hold in all years (They estimate 6 statistically significant coefficients across 20 party x time period comparisons spanning 1990-2004). In the YPSS, they find that abortion attitudes predict changes in partisanship for those previously identifying with either party between 1982 and 1997. In their analyses, sample sizes are small (a maximum of 435 partisans in any comparison) and the range of other issue positions and factors that are accounted for is limited, making it difficult to rule out the possibility that other issue positions or social factors correlated with abortion positions explain changes in partisanship. Additionally, their analysis sets aside independents and collapses partisanship to binary categories, leaving open the question of whether abortion attitudes also explain changes in relative strength of partisan identities or changes among independents.

Many other papers have also used the YPSS to study how abortion attitudes relate to partisanship. Achen and Bartels (2016) conduct a similar analysis and instead argue that social group membership, and not individual level opinions on abortion, explain realignment on the abortion issue in the 1980s. In particular, they show that changes in partisanship are most pronounced among women and that abortion attitudes appeared to move in line with parties' newly adopted positions on the issue. One challenge in interpreting the effect of gender on changes in partisanship is that because abortion regulation is particularly impactful for women

relative to men, the greater effect for women raises the possibility that it proxies perceived policy importance.

Erikson (2024) re-evaluates this conclusion, again using the YPSS. His analysis shows that those who were out of line with their party's position on abortion in 1982 were likely to change their party identification to match their abortion attitudes and that these changes were concentrated among the most ideologically engaged respondents, raising the possibility that other factors correlated with being ideologically engaged predict these changes. Another analysis (Gould and Klor 2019) uses this re-alignment as an instrument. Under the assumption that this realignment was caused only by prior abortion attitudes and had no additional effects that shape policy attitudes (i.e., the exclusion restriction assumption that there are no omitted variables correlated with abortion attitudes that also explain party and issue changes), they estimate that changing partisanship led to changes in other political, social, and economic attitudes. One general challenge with work using these data is that the party's positions on many issues evolved during this relatively long period and positions on issues like gender roles and redistribution might be correlated with abortion attitudes.

Overall, prior work provides inclusive and contrasting evidence on the relative importance of issue attitudes in explaining partisanship. While panel data provide a promising avenue for understanding the evolution of both issue positions and partisanship over time, the stability of individual issue positions, party positions, and partisanship tend to produce both strong and persistent correlations that provide little leverage for causal inference and theory testing. In the next section, we argue that an exogenous change in the importance or salience of an existing issue position, which we define as making issue positions policy-relevant, provides a novel way to identify whether pre-existing policy commitments can cause changes in partisanship despite fixed party positions. We note that this evidence does not rule out the possibility that partisanship also causes changes in issue commitments (as we explain in more detail below), but this research design is not designed to identify those effects.

Using a newly relevant issue position to assess how issues shape partisanship

To gain leverage on the role of issues positions in explaining changes in partisanship, we take advantage of an unexpected change in the relevance of party positions on an issue where individuals likely have longstanding policy commitments.[4] To make this exposition more straightforward, we begin with a theoretical model as follows:

$$\text{PartyID}_{i,t} = \Sigma_j(\text{IssuePosition}_{i,j,t}*\text{Issue Weight}_{i,j,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (1)$$

In this model party identification for person i is shaped by issue positions j, weighted by how they value them (which may be shaped by policy importance, policy confidence, or knowledge

[4] This is in contrast to approaches that rely on cases where parties either adopt issue positions on novel issues (e.g., Levendusky 2010) or switch positions over time (e.g., Lenz 2012). Those are often policy domains where individuals do not have deeply held prior value commitments (e.g., in Lenz's work, positions on economic integration) or the mapping of policy to values changes over time (e.g., in Levendusky's work, how values map into attitudes about stem cell regulation).

of party positions on the issues, for example). The error term, ε, includes all other factors that might explain partisanship (e.g. Green et al. 2002). All items are measured at the same time t.

The threats to inference from such a specification are factors that explain both partisanship and issue positions (e.g. social identification, habit) as well as the fact that issue positions may be endogenous to partisanship (Lenz 2012). Similarly, the problem with exploiting individual-level variation in issue weights is that those weights may themselves be affected by those factors. Now suppose all such individual-level factors are static over time, including issue positions. Setting aside measurement error and focusing on only a single issue (dropping the j subscript), this means that lagged partisanship will account for those factors, which yields a first difference:

$$\text{PartyID}_{i,t} - \text{PartyID}_{i,t-1} = \text{Issue Position}_{i,t-1} * \text{Change in Issue Weight}_{i,t-(t-1)} + \varepsilon_i. \quad (2)$$

Here, we model the change in partisanship from t-1 to t as caused by issue positions measured in period t-1, with a distinct error term ε that represents all other factors that might cause a change in party identification. But we still face an estimation problem: What explains variation in the weight given to issue positions over time that can rule out the endogeneity concern? Our approach is to use a case where there is an exogenous event that, on average, increases the weight given to a specific issue.

In our case, as explained above, we posit that the *Dobbs* decision increased the weight individuals would give to their abortion issue positions[5]. While each party staked out distinct positions on the abortion issue pre-*Dobbs*, the actual viable policy proposals of both sides largely "chipped around the edges," focusing on issues like rare late-term abortions and doctors' admitting privileges. After *Dobbs* abortion policy positions became immediately policy relevant, increasing the weight individuals likely gave to this policy consideration. (See Baden & Driver 2023 for a discussion of the greater divergence in state abortion laws following *Dobbs*, as well as of the possibility of national restrictions on abortion availability.) As a result, we estimate:

$$\text{ChangePartyID}_{i,t-(t-1)} = \text{Issue Position}_{i,t-1} + \text{IndicatorForPriorPID}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_i. \quad (3)$$

This is a change in partisanship model with covariates. We control for prior partisanship (as indicators) to account for average differences in changes by prior partisanship (for example, Strong Democrats at t-1 can only move to the right).[6] One way of interpreting the coefficients in this model is that the *Dobbs* decision produced a treatment effect in the public that is moderated by pre-*Dobbs* abortion attitudes—a heterogeneous treatment effects analysis. Our identification assumptions therefore must include, once we include controls, that there is no omitted variable

[5] While parties might deliberately activate specific issues (Aragonès et al. 2014), the *Dobbs* decision was a Supreme Court decision whose timing was not the result of electoral calculus by party leaders. Of course, party strategies after such an event will have long term implications for the effect of the exogenous shocks to issue salience on equilibrium political competition.

[6] We find nearly identical results if instead of estimating a first difference model we predict current partisanship controlling for lagged partisanship (see appendix Table A10). The risk from that specification is that measurement error may inflate apparent effects of lagged issue positions (see Fowler 2020). A first difference addresses this concern since random measurement error in both lagged and current partisanship would on average produce no change in partisanship.

correlated with abortion attitudes that explains the heterogeneous effects we observe. This includes, for example, that there are no other issue positions correlated with abortion attitudes that also explain shifts toward the same party during the period we study.

To be clear, this approach does not imply that partisanship cannot also cause issue positions, and in general it is true that it is difficult to determine whether attitudes or partisanship come first causally. However, because of the panel nature of the data, we can directly observe how Americans with abortion attitudes out of step with their party respond to the change in salience. These results, as we discuss more below, are not observationally equivalent to partisanship causing attitudes because that would mean that pre-existing abortion attitudes instead shifted post-*Dobbs* to align with pre-existing partisanship. Importantly, if there is a portion of the electorate for whom attitudes on abortion are caused by partisanship (or whose abortion attitudes are ephemeral), our estimate using this model will be pooling the effect of persistent abortion attitudes on partisanship among those for whom there is a potential effect on partisanship with the likely null effect among those for whom policy attitudes on abortion follow partisanship. This would mean the estimate of the average effect of pre-*Dobbs* abortion attitudes on post-*Dobbs* partisanship would likely be an underestimate of the effect of stable attitudes on partisanship

Data and analysis approach

Our primary data source is a large-scale public opinion survey spanning pre- and post-*Dobbs* public opinion. These data were collected by YouGov as part of past public opinion surveys and a survey focused on the 2024 election. Further details about the survey are in the appendix, including full question wording and summary statistics (Table A1). Pre-*Dobbs*, we have measures of partisanship, multiple measures of abortion policy opinions, a measure of abortion importance, and other issue positions. Post-*Dobbs*, we have contemporary (late 2023) partisanship, a novel abortion policy preference battery that maps on to the current policy landscape (Hernandez n.d.), measures of abortion policy confidence and importance, and a rich battery of demographics. Because of the long timeframe covered by the panel, it is unlikely to be representative and as we show in the appendix it is not. Out of 130,000 respondents interviewed in 2023, we have historical partisanship and abortion preferences for 50,000 of them. However, the sample is large and diverse, allowing us to control for different demographics effectively. All analysis is weighted to a national sample using weights provided by YouGov and our core regression results are robust to omitting weights and the inclusion of demographic covariates.

Prior to presenting our key theoretical tests, we document the stability and distribution of abortion policy preferences and the preponderance of respondents whose Pre-*Dobbs* partisanship was mismatched with their abortion policy preferences. Next, we show that the *Dobbs* decision is associated with an increase in the measured salience of abortion policy opinions, both on average among all Americans and among these survey respondents (particularly with more liberal abortion opinions). Then, we conduct two key tests in line with the model above. First, we present a transition analysis of changes in partisanship, measured using a standard 7-point scale, from before *Dobbs* to after it, for those with different abortion policy positions. Our key prediction is individuals with liberal abortion attitudes will be more likely to move their partisan in the Democratic direction than are those with conservative attitudes, who we expect to move towards being Republican. Additionally, we expect these effects to be larger for those who view

abortion as more important and are more confident in their abortion opinions (Carsey & Layman 2006; Gerber et al. 2011; Erikson 2024).

Our second analysis is regression-based and builds on the transition matrices results while allowing us to leverage all our data and account for other factors that might explain perturbations in partisanship. For example, our transition analysis only examines differences between those with relatively extreme views. Additionally, it does not account for other factors, like gender or other issue positions, that may also be correlated with changes in partisanship during this period. Finally, we use the regression format to investigate whether changes were largest among those for whom the salience of abortion increased, as our theoretical model implies. We interact the effect of abortion attitudes with (1) contemporaneous measures of individual importance (and confidence), (2) changes in abortion importance, and (3) across differences in state laws that might predict where abortion became more salient. These models are therefore heterogenous treatment effects analyses (by pre-*Dobbs* abortion positions) in an interrupted time series with additional tests focusing on moderating variables, including importance/salience (as potentially affected by *Dobbs*).

Results

Meaningful Abortion Attitudes and Misaligned Voters

Before describing the impact of abortion attitudes on changes in partisanship, we first characterize abortion attitudes and their relationship to pre-*Dobbs* partisanship. We find that abortion attitudes are largely stable and that voters with misaligned attitudes in 2020 generally otherwise reflected the overall composition of their party's supporters at the time: they voted for their party's nominee, were otherwise ideologically aligned with their party, and had similar demographic to other party supporters.

First, we examine the stability of abortion attitudes to show that these are real opinions. Recent work using similar data shows that abortion attitudes are generally highly stable over time, with stability levels as high as those of personality traits and views towards politicians (Hernandez et al., 2024). In our dataset, the polychoric correlation in abortion attitudes from pre-*Dobbs* to December 2023 using our preferred historical measure is .82. (.83 unweighted). These are substantively very high over such a long period. In the appendix, we also examine the demographic correlates of attitude change in Table A19.

Who were the voters misaligned on abortion attitudes and partisanship pre-*Dobbs*? First, we show that they were out of line with their party on abortion but continued to vote for their party at high rates. Panel A of Table A17 shows the vote choice among partisans with the most liberal abortion opinions. We estimate that 89% of Democrats with these liberal abortion attitudes backed Biden in 2020, while Trump attracted the support of 63% of Republicans with very liberal abortion attitudes, and only 12% voted for Biden. Panel B presents parallel results among those with the most conservative abortion policy position. The results mirror those in Panel A. Trump received support from 88% of these Republicans while Biden received support from 66% of these Democrats. Overall, while these voters were more likely to defect than aligned partisans, they were still likely to vote for their own party relative to the opposition by ratios of between 6 and 7 to 1.

Second, in Appendix Table A20 we provide summary statistics describing the demographic and political characteristics of mismatched and matched Democrats and Republicans (using the same definition of being matched as before). We find that mismatched partisans are broadly reflective of their parties (compared to the other party), but they are still different in salient and expected ways. Comparing within party, mismatched Democrats are less educated, less likely to be White, more religious, less attentive to politics, and more conservative on immigration. Among Republicans, mismatched respondents are more likely to be unmarried, are less religious, less attentive to politics, and more liberal on Medicare expansion. Importantly, despite these differences, these mismatched partisans are nonetheless still clearly partisan: mismatched Democrats are much more liberal on pre-*Dobbs* political issues than mismatched Republicans (gun control, immigration policy, and Medicare expansion). Mismatched Democrats (Republicans) are not closet Republicans (Democrats) who simply identified with the wrong party pre-*Dobbs*. The other ways in which these mismatched respondents differ from their party's supporters motivate our inclusion of these variables in our multivariate analyses to address concerns about omitted variables bias (correlated with pre-*Dobbs* abortion attitudes and changes in partisanship).

Dobbs Increased Abortion Salience

The theoretical model proposed earlier argues that the change in partisanship associated with preexisting abortion policy attitudes can be attributed to an average increase in the weight voters place on those attitudes. This necessarily requires a change in the salience of abortion. Here we show using data from external sources and our present study that abortion importance has risen following the *Dobbs* decision.

Figure 1 displays a measure of abortion importance from Gallup's public polling data, tracking attitudes from 2020 to 2023. The graph shows the reported importance of abortion for making up one's mind on who to vote for.[7] The data shows a sizable increase in the number of respondents who view abortion as a dealbreaker for their vote choice: they would not vote for someone who held a different view on abortion. There was also an increase in the proportion of respondents who said abortion was one of many important factors. Conversely, there is a very steep decline in the number of respondents who report abortion as not being at all important in their vote choice.

Figure 1. Change in reported importance of abortion to vote choice among Americans. Data from Gallup.

[7] The exact question wording is "Thinking about how the abortion issue might affect your vote for major offices, would you -- [ROTATED: only vote for a candidate who shares your views on abortion (or) consider a candidate's position on abortion as just one of many important factors (or) not see abortion as a major issue]?" (Gallup 2024)



Our own data focusing only on measured importance show a similar pattern. We present formal regression analysis in Table 1. Using the 4-point abortion importance item for which we have panel data, column (1) shows that the average importance attached to abortion increased from pre- to post- *Dobbs* by .025 units (weighted, p<.05). This average masks substantial variation, however. Column (2) shows that importance increased substantially for those who previously viewed abortion as "unimportant" (1.31 units, p<.01) or "not very important" (.41 units, p<.01), while it decreased for those who previously though abortion was "somewhat" (-.21, p<.01) or "very" (-.66, p<.01) important.

Table 1. Change in importance given to abortion from pre- to post-*Dobbs*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Change in Importance, Post minus Pre-*Dobbs*			
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Importance = Unimportant (baseline)				
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Importance = Not Very		-0.897		-0.821
		[0.038]***		[0.040]***
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Importance = Somewhat		-1.518		-1.436
		[0.036]***		[0.038]***
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Importance = Very important		-1.967		-1.945
		[0.036]***		[0.042]***
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Policy Pref. = "Legal in all cases"			0.802	0.658
			[0.038]***	[0.032]***
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Policy Pref. = "Legal in most cases"			0.522	0.183

			[0.031]***	[0.026]***
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Policy Pref. = "Illegal in most cases" (baseline)				
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Policy Pref. = "Illegal in all cases"			-0.055	0.340
			[0.042]	[0.046]***
Constant	0.025	1.306	-0.280	1.035
	[0.013]**	[0.031]***	[0.020]***	[0.037]***
Observations	14236	14236	13217	13217
R-squared	0.000	0.337	0.080	0.377

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

This change in importance is also correlated with pre-*Dobbs* abortion policy attitudes, as is shown in columns (3) and (4). In column (3) we estimate that abortion importance increased for those who believed abortion should be legal in "all" or "most" cases (estimates of .52 and .24 units, respectively, both $p<.01$) while decreasing for those who believed it should be illegal in "most" or "all" cases (estimates of -.28 and -.34, respectively, $p<.01$).

Finally, in column (4) we also control for pre-*Dobbs* importance as indicators, which produces slightly different results for one group: Those who believe abortion should be illegal in "all" cases. For this group, abortion importance increased compared to those who believed it should be illegal in "most" cases, with the different result from column (3) likely reflecting the average differences in prior importance between the two groups: strongly anti-abortion respondents had the highest importance pre-*Dobbs*.

Transition Analysis

Next, we present raw data summarizing the relationship between pre- and post-*Dobbs* partisanship and abortion attitudes. Table 2 presents (1) the distributions of current partisanship by pre-*Dobbs* partisanship for those with the most liberal attitudes for each measure, (2) the same for those with the most conservative attitude, and finally (3) the difference between the two, which is a difference estimator. These transition matrices are transparent representations of the data and are functionally flexible (non-parametric) in how they show change in partisanship.

Table 2. Post-*Dobbs* PID by Pre-*Dobbs* PID and Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Attitudes (Cells sum to 100% by row). Sample includes all respondents with PID information pre-*Dobbs*.

Panel A: Respondents with the most liberal pre-*Dobbs* abortion policy position. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.) = Legal in all cases.

	Current PID						
	SD	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-*Dobbs* PID							
S. Dem	92.2	3.8	3.2	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.0

W. Dem	16.7	66.1	9.5	4.8	0.8	1.0	1.1
L. Dem	10.1	7.2	72.3	9.4	0.7	0.1	0.2
Independent	3.3	2.1	12.1	76.8	4.0	1.3	0.6
L. Rep	0.0	0.5	3.2	21.3	55.0	9.5	10.5
W. Rep	1.7	2.2	1.9	5.9	4.5	74.5	9.3
S. Rep	3.9	0.3	0.0	2.3	2.3	14.0	77.2

Panel B: Respondents with the most conservative pre-*Dobbs* abortion policy position. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.) = Illegal in all cases.

	Current PID						
	S. Dem	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-*Dobbs* PID							
S. Dem	74.1	12.6	1.3	8.5	1.1	0.2	2.1
W. Dem	8.0	64.4	2.7	15.8	3.3	3.5	2.3
L. Dem	5.8	12.4	46.0	27.6	5.3	1.6	1.3
Independent	0.9	0.8	1.2	74.5	12.9	5.7	4.0
L. Rep	0.0	0.0	0.3	12.7	66.4	5.7	14.9
W. Rep	0.5	2.3	0.5	6.2	10.0	63.5	17.0
S. Rep	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.6	3.4	4.4	91.5

Panel C: Difference between the above two tables (i.e. those with the most liberal position minus those with the most conservative position). (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)

	Current PID						
	S. Dem	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-*Dobbs* PID							
S. Dem	18.1	-8.8	1.9	-7.9	-1.1	-0.1	-2.1
W. Dem	8.7	1.6	6.9	-11.0	-2.5	-2.4	-1.3
L. Dem	4.3	-5.1	26.3	-18.2	-4.6	-1.5	-1.1
Independent	2.4	1.3	10.8	2.3	-8.9	-4.5	-3.4
L. Rep	0.0	0.5	2.9	8.6	-11.4	3.8	-4.3
W. Rep	1.2	-0.1	1.4	-0.3	-5.5	11.0	-7.7
S. Rep	3.8	0.3	0.0	1.7	-1.1	9.5	-14.2

We use the pre-*Dobbs* abortion policy question for which we have the largest sample (N=50,644). Approximately 14,000 respondents had the most liberal policy position, indicating they believed abortion should be legal in all cases (see appendix Table A2 for cell sizes). The fourth row in Panel A shows that among those who were Independents, 76.8% remain Independents, but of the remaining ~23%, 17.5%, or about three quarters of those whose partisanship changed, moved toward the Democratic Party. Among Leaning Republicans, the 5th row, there is lower partisan stability (55%), and 25% moved toward the Democratic party (about 55% of those who changed). Overall, for individuals whose liberal abortion policy preferences were misaligned with their prior partisanship, they moved toward the Democratic Party.

On the other end of the spectrum, of the 4,758 respondents who took the most conservative policy position that abortion should be illegal in all cases, Panel B shows that changes in partisanship are toward the Republican Party. Among Independents who opposed abortion, 75%

had the same partisanship post-*Dobbs*. But of the 25% whose partisanship changed, 22.6% (90%) shifted toward the Republican Party.

Finally, in Panel C we calculate the difference in these two transition matrices, meaning how much more likely we are to see a given post-*Dobbs* partisanship conditional on a Pre-*Dobbs* partisanship and liberal versus conservative pre-*Dobbs* attitudes. This differences out secular changes in partisanship across both groups. It is immediately apparent that having a more liberal rather than conservative abortion view is associated with a leftward shift in partisanship: The number below the diagonal (which represents static partisanship) are generally positive (average of 2.1 points) and those above it are negative (average of -3.8). Pay particular attention to the rows for partisan leaners, who are behaviorally some of the strongest partisans (Klar & Krupnikov 2016). Leaning Republicans who are strongly prochoice are 11.4 points less likely to remain Leaning Republicans than those who are strongly prolife. They are also 8.6 points more likely to have become Independents and 3.2 points more likely to have become some sort of Democrat. On the other side of the spectrum, Leaning Democrats who are prolife (compared to those who are prochoice) are 18.2 points more likely to have become Independents and 7.2 points more likely to have become some sort of Republican. Finally, strongly pro-choice Independents are 14.5 points more likely to have some level of Democratic identification and 16.8 points less likely to have some level of Republican identification than strongly pro-life Independents.

In the appendix, we present two extensions to this analysis. First, in Table A3 we use our post-*Dobbs* abortion policy index, which is constructed from a factor analysis of answers to preferred legal timing options for 6 different abortion reasons (Hernandez n.d.), to identify the 25% most liberal and 25% most conservative respondents. The advantages of these items are both that they provide more equal distribution of conservatives and liberals and that they fit the contemporary policy space where the law can specify different timings for different reasons, although they are sensitive to concerns about post-treatment bias. We find highly similar, if not larger shifts, showing our results are not an artifact of the somewhat vague earlier policy questions.

Second, in Table A4 we repeat our initial transition analysis after restricting our analysis to two relevant subsamples: Those who thought abortion was maximally important pre-*Dobbs* and those who had the highest self-expressed confidence in their post-*Dobbs* abortion policy attitudes. In the overall sample, the average net move in the Democratic direction (the average of all cells below the diagonal) minus the average net move in the Republican direction (the average of all cells above the diagonal) is 5.7 points. In the high importance subsample it is 6.6 points, and in the high confidence subsample it is 7.9 points.

Regression Analysis

In our regression analysis, we examine the effect of abortion policy preferences on contemporaneous partisanship, controlling for pre-*Dobbs* partisanship entered as indicators. This is equivalent to equation (3) above, with the accompanying identification assumptions.

We begin by examining the main effect of abortion policy preferences on changes from pre- to post-*Dobbs* partisanship in Table 3. We estimate all models using OLS with robust standard

errors and weights provided by YouGov.[8] For both measures of policy preferences used in the transition analysis, we present 3 different specifications. Our first specification is the effect of pre-*Dobbs* opinions on change in partisanship controlling only for levels of pre-*Dobbs* partisanship.[9] Focusing on change in partisanship as the outcome allows us to mitigate concerns of measurement error. The second specification adds a rich array of demographic correlates, entered using indicators to avoid making strong functional form assumptions (Age in decades, gender, education, race/ethnicity, marital status, income, employment status, importance of religion, religious identity, immigrant status, census region, and political interest). These covariates account for important factors that may explain changes in partisanship over time due to social attachments (Green et al. 2002) or secular forces that move some groups more than others toward one party (e.g., education), which could generate bias if those factors are correlated with abortion policy preferences (e.g., if education and abortion policy preferences were correlated).

Our third specification includes 3 important issue positions measured pre-*Dobbs* for which we have answers from a significant portion of the sample. These are respondents' views on healthcare, immigration, and gun control. This specification is the most conservative, in that it controls for other issues that might also have explained changes in partisanship given changing political competition between the two parties on these key issues, especially immigration.

Table 3. The impact of abortion policy preferences on change in partisanship from pre- to post-*Dobbs*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pre- to Post-*Dobbs* Change in 7-point Partisanship (+=More Republican)					
Controls for Pre-*Dobbs* Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Controls for other Pre-*Dobbs* issue positions			Yes			Yes
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.118	0.093	0.046			
	[0.009]***	[0.009]***	[0.012]***			
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)				0.139	0.131	0.057
				[0.007]***	[0.008]***	[0.011]***
Constant	-0.022	-0.099	-0.350	0.293	0.265	-0.194
	[0.015]	[0.184]	[0.176]**	[0.012]***	[0.188]	[0.182]
Observations	50644	49328	21118	53696	52813	21158
R-squared	0.056	0.066	0.094	0.063	0.073	0.094

Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Models 1 and 4 in Table 4, those that include no controls, suggest that the *Dobbs* ruling is associated with greater alignment between abortion attitudes and partisanship, consistent with the transition matrices presented above. A one unit change in abortion attitudes on the 4-point scale

[8] Models estimated using ordered probit appear in appendix Tables A6 and A7, where the dependent variable is post-treatment PID rather than change in PID because ordered probit models do not allow for negative outcome variables.

[9] One key reason, per the transition matrix analysis, for controlling for pre-Dobbs partisanship is that certain groups (Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans) can only move in one direction. See appendix Table A11 for analysis broken down by prior partisanship, which shows we find the same pattern of coefficients for all partisan subgroups.

is associated with a 0.118 change in partisanship, equivalent to around 1 in 10 individuals moving their partisanship from weak partisan to strong partisan to align with their abortion attitudes. Models 2 and 5 suggest a small role for demographic variables correlated with abortion attitudes in explaining that association because including those items has small effects on the estimated effect of issue positions. Finally, models 3 and 6 are the most conservative, including pre-*Dobbs* issue positions (which appendix Table A20 shows differ somewhat by whether a respondent's pre-*Dobbs* abortion positions are aligned with their 2020 partisanship). In these models, the coefficients are reduced (though still substantively important). We estimate a coefficient around 0.05, suggesting a one unit increase in abortion conservatism is associated with around 1 in 20 Americans moving their PID towards the Republican party by 1 point.[10]

In Table A5 we present models that hold the sample constant, using only the respondents for whom we have pre-*Dobbs* non-abortion issue positions. These results show the attenuation in coefficients between models 2 and 3 (5 and 6) is due to both the inclusion of these issues and the different sample. In appendix Table A1, we show that the sample becomes more heavily male as we restrict it in this way, which may explain some of the decrease in the apparent magnitude of the effect in models with restricted samples. In appendix Table A9, we present parallel models for seven additional measures of abortion policy preferences and find similar results. In appendix Table A16, we repeat the table excluding strong partisans, finding similar patterns. This suggests the findings aren't driven only by change within partisanship (i.e., from strong to weak partisanship). In appendix Table A13 we limit the sample to only respondents who provided the pre-*Dobbs* partisan identifications in either 2021 and 2022 or just in 2022, to limit the possibility that something else changed prior to *Dobbs* that caused the change in partisanship we observe. We find that the results are substantively the same. In appendix Table A18, we present results without survey weights and they are also substantively the same.

As discussed above, we also examine three theoretically-motivated heterogenous effects models in Table 4 to investigate the mechanism driving the alignment we note in Table 2. First, we include the interaction between policy preferences and policy confidence. We expect the effect of pre-*Dobbs* opinions on changes in partisanship to be larger for those who are more confident in their views (Gerber et al. 2011). Confidence is measured post-*Dobbs* using 5 response categories rescaled linearly on the 0-1 scale with larger values indicating greater confidence. Our next specifications replace confidence with importance. The first measure of importance is measured post-treatment on the same scale. Our last specification uses a pre-*Dobbs* measure of policy importance from 2014, almost a decade before this study was conducted, to address concerns that contemporary importance may be affected by the shifting abortion policy landscape. We have a much smaller sample size for this item, which is coded from 4 response categories and is also rescaled linearly to range from 0-1.

Table 4. The impact of abortion policy preferences on change in partisanship from pre- to post-*Dobbs*, by reported issue importance and confidence.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)

[10] Note that measurement error (i.e. if abortion attitudes are reported at random and not meaningfully held), this would introduce random noise and bias the coefficients towards zero. While we argue these attitudes are deeply held (Hernandez et al. 2024), the bias induced by instability of attitudes runs counter to our findings.

	Current Partisanship (1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican)											
Controls for Pre-*Dobbs* Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for other Pre-*Dobbs* issue positions				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.092	0.039	0.051	0.031	0.006	0.025						
	[0.017] ***	[0.017] **	[0.031]	[0.024]	[0.020]	[0.017]						
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)							0.101	0.061	0.094	0.037	0.010	0.043
							[0.014] ***	[0.013] ***	[0.022] ***	[0.020] *	[0.016]	[0.014] ***
Confidence, Abortion (0-1)	-0.120			-0.091			0.011			-0.017		
	[0.049] **			[0.068]			[0.018]			[0.026]		
Conf * Opinion	0.041			0.027			0.063			0.033		
	[0.020] **			[0.028]			[0.018] ***			[0.025]		
Importance, Abortion (0-1)		-0.416			-0.181			-0.119			-0.029	
		[0.051] ***			[0.058] ***			[0.016] ***			[0.022]	
Impt * Opinion		0.120			0.063			0.116			0.077	
		[0.021] ***			[0.023] ***			[0.016] ***			[0.020] ***	
Abortion Importance Pre-*Dobbs* (0-1)			-0.085			-0.037			-0.001			0.015
			[0.065]			[0.045]			[0.023]			[0.019]
Pre-*Dobbs* Impt * Opinion			0.041			0.023			0.041			0.020
			[0.033]			[0.019]			[0.024] *			[0.017]
Constant	0.054	0.281	0.015	-0.287	-0.204	-0.275	0.290	0.400	0.206	-0.180	-0.136	-0.206
	[0.039]	[0.043] ***	[0.056]	[0.173] *	[0.178]	[0.698]	[0.017] ***	[0.018] ***	[0.025] ***	[0.185]	[0.190]	[0.693]
Observations	49269	49558	16696	20920	20986	13400	52791	53075	17582	20977	21039	13453
R-squared	0.056	0.061	0.047	0.094	0.094	0.098	0.063	0.066	0.056	0.095	0.095	0.097

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Examining the interaction between confidence and importance with abortion attitudes, we find that consistent with a model of attitudinal driven partisanship change, individuals who are more confident in their abortion attitudes and view the issue as more important are more likely to align their partisanship with their pre-existing abortion attitudes. The interaction effects in columns 1 and 7 imply that the most confident individuals are around 50% more likely to move their partisanship than the least confident individuals. Columns 2 and 8 show that for importance this effect is even larger with those rating abortion as the most important being 2-3 times more likely to move their partisanship in the direction of their abortion attitudes. Finally, in columns 3 and 9 we look at pre-*Dobbs* importance of abortion. Our estimates have larger standard errors and are at best only marginally significant, although the coefficients are similar in size to the more

precisely estimated interaction with confidence.[11] Columns 4-6 and 10-12 demonstrate the robustness of these heterogenous treatment effect estimates to the inclusion of the complete array of demographic covariates and other pre-*Dobbs* issue positions reported in Table 3. The confidence interactions are no longer significant, while the post-*Dobbs* importance interactions remain significant with magnitudes that decrease by as much as 50% (and the pre-Dobbs importance interactions remain insignificant).

Finally, we also replicate our basic modeling approach but instead examine whether abortion *attitudes* change from pre- to post-*Dobbs* as a result of pre-*Dobbs* partisanship in Table A14. We find some evidence that the *Dobbs* decision caused respondents to change their stated abortion preferences to more closely align with their prior partisanship. As we note above, that partisanship might move attitudes is not incompatible with the fact that attitudes also move partisanship. The panel nature of our data allows us to independently measure this effect. However, we do not focus on these results as they are difficult to disentangle from partisans changing how they understand these questions from their attitudes towards abortion. Hernandez (n.d.) shows that partisans attach different meaning to labels such as "pro-life" and "pro-choice," making it hard to directly compare movement on abortion attitudes measured using less specific question wordings. (Importantly, if there were partisan differences in how groups interpreted the abortion item pre-*Dobbs*, so that Democrats interpreted the same category more liberally than did Republicans, this would tend to work against finding that those attitudes predict changes in partisanship.) In this case, we have only our non-preferred abortion policy question measured both prior to and after *Dobbs*. While suggestive that attitudes may be influenced by partisanship, we are hesitant to stake stronger claims here given concerns about changing measurement error (interpretation of survey categories) correlated with pre-*Dobbs* partisanship.

A final testable implication of our model is that the *changes* in party identification caused by abortion attitudes should be largest for respondents who also increased the importance they place on abortion. We test this at both the individual and group level. First, we show that the effects of abortion attitudes on partisanship are largest for voters who experienced an *increase* in the importance they attach to abortion from pre- to post- *Dobbs*. Second, we test whether these effects are driven by states where abortion laws moved the most (become more conservative) following the decision. We find no evidence that respondents in states that adopted more restrictive abortion laws viewed abortion as more important than those in other states, perhaps indicating that individuals were concerned about the possibility of national abortion policy.

Table 5. The impact of abortion policy preferences on change in partisanship from pre- to post-*Dobbs*, by change in issue importance from pre- to post- *Dobbs*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pre- to Post-*Dobbs* Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)			
Controls for Pre-*Dobbs* Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

[11] As an alternative, we code importance and confidence relatively within respondents to account for variation in average confidence and importance across individuals. Results are similar, see appendix Table A8.

Controls for Demographics and other policy items		Yes		Yes
Pre-*Dobbs* Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	-0.002	0.007	0.083	0.067
	[0.046]	[0.021]	[0.014]***	[0.011]***
Abortion Importance Pre-*Dobbs* (0-1)	-0.361	-0.303		
	[0.112]***	[0.065]***		
Change in Importance, Post minus Pre-*Dobbs*	-0.111	-0.107	-0.042	-0.048
	[0.026]***	[0.023]***	[0.015]***	[0.017]***
Pre-*Dobbs* Impt * Opinion	0.133	0.099		
	[0.054]**	[0.026]***		
Change in Impt * Opinion	0.035	0.030	0.011	0.012
	[0.011]***	[0.008]***	[0.006]*	[0.006]*
Constant	0.205	0.492	-0.040	0.291
	[0.094]**	[0.274]*	[0.024]*	[0.265]
Observations	13217	13047	13217	13047
R-squared	0.053	0.079	0.049	0.077

Robust standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

If the effect of *Dobbs* on partisanship operates via changes in issue salience, then voters whose issue salience increased should be more affected by the *Dobbs* decision; our model would suggest a larger increase in importance should be associated with a greater likelihood of a change in partisanship. We model this in Table 5 among the subset of our sample that answered both the abortion policy items pre-*Dobbs* and the abortion importance items in both waves (maximum N=13,217) by interacting respondent pre-*Dobbs* abortion attitudes with the change in their issue importance from before to after the *Dobbs* decision. In columns (1) and (2) we include interactions both with Pre-*Dobbs* importance and the change in importance, while in columns (3) and (4) we include only the change in importance measures and interactions. We find significant effects in the models (columns 1 and 2) that include both the baseline level of importance and the change, whether we include other covariates or not: respondents with a larger increase in importance re-aligned their partisanship more than those whose importance did not increase.[12] In models that do not also control for past importance, the interactions between change in importance and abortion attitudes have p-values near .10.

Finally, we additionally check whether this effect is driven by differences in state laws. There is wide variance in how states responded to the *Dobbs* decision: some states had "trigger laws" that immediately restricted access to abortion while other states created state level protections for the right to an abortion. We find that the change in abortion importance is, on average, the same across states that did and not enact total bans on abortion (see appendix Table A15). Additionally, the increase in abortion importance is not greater for prochoice individuals in these states, perhaps because the issue of abortion relates both to state and national policy. Given that we do not find differences in abortion importance across state laws, it is perhaps not surprising

[12] One concern with these specifications is that a change in importance relies on a measure of importance recorded post-*Dobbs* and contemporaneously with partisanship. As a consequence, we cannot rule out the possibility that a change in partisanship might cause a change in issue importance (that is, pro-choice respondents who became more Democratic might have increased the importance they attached to abortion because the Democratic Party focused more on abortion).

that we also find that there is no evidence of an interaction between prior abortion attitudes and state-level laws in explaining changes in partisanship.

Discussion

What explains partisan identifications in the mass public? We take advantage of an unusual but important event, the overturning of *Roe v. Wade* by the Supreme Court, to provide a novel window into understanding how preexisting issue opinions shape partisan identification. This change, combined with novel large scale panel data, allows us to disentangle the causal mechanism that underpins the tight correlation between issue positions and partisanship, because we can directly observe how those out of step with their party attachment behave in response to an exogenous change in the importance of that misalignment. We estimate that when abortion attitudes became policy relevant, some individuals with partisan attachments at odds with their policy preferences adjusted their partisanship to reflect their increasingly relevant policy attitudes. Thus, partisanship does not appear to be purely an "unmoved mover" of issue positions as some have theorized (Johnston 2006), but instead a consequence of those opinions, for at least some people. While we do not rule out that partisanship might cause political attitudes in some cases, the panel nature of our data eliminates the possibility that our results are caused by this reverse causality.

We document that the *Dobbs* decision is associated with an increase in the importance individuals attach to abortion, particularly for those with more liberal abortion attitudes. We also observe important heterogeneity in the effects we document that provide further evidence of our hypothesized mechanism. Our model lays out clear expectations that the effects should be largest for respondents who are confident in their abortion attitudes and for whom abortion policy is important. We find that the effects of abortion attitudes on partisanship are larger for those who are more confident in their policy attitudes and view the issue as more important. Additionally, we show that for people who experience *increases* in the salience of abortion, the effects of abortion attitudes on partisanship are also larger.

Our results provide an important glimpse into the relationship between policy attitudes and partisanship that is often impossible to observe due to the tight coupling of attitudes and partisanship. Because these attitudes usually develop jointly, identifying which came first present a challenge. Naturalistic situations that will break the observational equivalence of theories of partisanship or issues as causes of the other will be rare, but in this case, we estimate that some individuals whose abortion attitudes were misaligned with their partisanship changed their partisanship as a consequence.

While generalizing from a specific case may be hard, we note above that abortion is both a tough and easy case for demonstrating the importance of issues. Against finding an effect, both parties have staked out clearly divergent issues positions on the issue for years, so if partisanship drives issues positions, then people should have aligned their abortion attitudes with their parties. On the other hand, abortion attitudes are deeply held for many (e.g., Luker 1985; Osbourne et al. 2022), especially in comparison to other issues (although for those who already cared a great deal, there was likely already pressure to align their partisanship with their issue positions). In light of this, our average estimates are likely driven by those whose partisanship was previously misaligned with their now-salient issue positions (in the top or bottom 25% of our abortion factor

score; see appendix Table A12). Conservatively, we estimate this is about 1 in every 14 Pre-*Dobbs* Democrats and Republicans held misaligned preferences, and that about 1/2 of Independents held extreme abortion preferences. In short, while such situations may be rare, they provide powerful evidence that issues have an important role in shaping and reshaping partisan coalitions in the mass public.

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Appendix

Additional Information on Data Collected

Our data comes from a panel survey, conducted by YouGov. This survey includes a baseline sample of approximately 130,000 respondents in the United States recruited from YouGov's online survey panel. YouGov's panel is an opt-in panel where respondents are invited to take surveys in return for 'points' they can redeem for rewards. Samples are selected to be demographically diverse so that weighting can be performed to match targets, but in the case of this sample it is not designed to match national targets without weighting. Additionally, to ensure low attrition respondents in the SAY panel tend to have longer histories with YouGov which reduces the likelihood they will drop out of the sample.

The SAY panel provides a unique opportunity to study public opinion as it is one of the largest panels available with both high frequency re-contacts but also a large time span covered by the panel. Data is weighted to reflect national demographic characteristics and all results presented are with weights. Baseline information for this group was collected in December of 2023 and early January of 2024, with 4 follow-up surveys throughout 2024.

The demographic controls we use in our analysis are from the baseline survey and include age in decades, gender (4 categories), education (4 categories), race/ethnicity (8 categories), marital status (6 categories), income (16 categories), employment status (7 categories), importance of religion (4 categories), religious identity (12 categories), immigrant status (5 categories), census region, and political interest (4 categories).

Additionally, because the sample was recruited from YouGov's online panel, we can recover attitudes towards abortion and partisanship from 2022 and earlier for a very large subset of our respondents. A non-random subset of the 130,000 respondents have been taking surveys with YouGov since before the Dobbs decision, allowing us to retrieve their abortion attitudes and partisanship from before abortion was reintroduced as a major policy issue in 2022. We have 9 different measures of abortion policy attitudes which we summarize below.

In the main text, we rely on the two measures we have the most data for. Our pre-Dobbs measure is:
Which comes closest to your position on abortion? Do you think abortion should be…

- Legal in all cases
- Legal in most cases
- Illegal in most cases
- Illegal in all cases

Our post-Dobbs measure is:
Up to what point in a pregnancy do you think abortion should be legal for each of the following reasons?

Response options

- Never legal
- Legal up to 6 weeks into pregnancy
- Legal up to 12 weeks

- Legal up to 15 weeks
- Legal up to 24 weeks (fetal viability)
- Legal up to the point of birth

Reasons

- Mother develops a life-threatening medical condition that can only be treated if the pregnancy is ended
- Fetus is found to have a serious physical or mental disability, such as Downs Syndrome, that will have implications for the child's life
- The pregnancy is the result of rape or incest
- Mother can't afford to have the child
- The mother believes having the child would interfere with her educational or career aspirations
- Mother doesn't want a child of that specific sex

Additionally, we have 7 other measures of abortion attitudes measured pre-Dobbs with results reported in the appendix.

Which comes closest to your view on abortion?

- It should always be legal
- It should be legal most of the time
- It should be made illegal except in cases of rape, incest and to save the mother's life
- It should be made illegal without any exceptions

When do you believe abortion should be legal?

- Always
- Until the fetus can live outside the womb
- In the first trimester of a pregnancy
- Only in special cases (such as rape, incest, or when the health of the mother is at risk)
- Never

Would you call yourself "pro-life" or "pro-choice"?

- Pro-life
- Pro-choice
- Both pro-life and pro-choice
- Neither
- Not sure

Do you think abortion should be...

- Legal in all cases

- Legal in some cases and illegal in others
- Illegal in all cases
- Not sure

Abortion is morally wrong.

- Disagree strongly
- Disagree generally
- Disagree somewhat
- Agree somewhat
- Agree generally
- Agree strongly

Do you think abortion should be..

- Legal in all cases
- Legal in most cases
- Illegal in most cases
- Illegal in all cases

When do you think abortion should be legal?

- Abortion should always be legal. There should be no restrictions on abortion.
- Abortion should be legal, but with some restrictions (such as for minors or late-term abortions).
- Abortion should only be legal in special circumstances, such as when the life of the mother is in danger.
- Abortion should be illegal. It should never be allowed.

Description of survey sample

Table A1. Description of sample demographic characteristics and abortion attitudes. Columns match specifications used in Table 3 in the main text.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)	0.031	0.031	0.023	0.036	0.036	0.022
	[.7793]	[.7715]	[.6701]	[.8057]	[.7997]	[.6736]
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)	4.001	4.007	4.220	4.009	4.011	4.216
	[2.2668]	[2.271]	[2.2875]	[2.261]	[2.2634]	[2.2858]
Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)	4.032	4.037	4.243	4.045	4.047	4.239
	[2.2723]	[2.2772]	[2.2965]	[2.2691]	[2.2726]	[2.2949]
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	2.305	2.302	2.387	2.300	2.298	2.382
	[.9654]	[.964]	[.9496]	[.9657]	[.9641]	[.9498]
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)	-0.075	-0.076	-0.004	-0.067	-0.069	-0.004
	[1.017]	[1.0167]	[.9994]	[1.0137]	[1.0133]	[.9997]
Importance, Abortion (0-1)	0.594	0.594	0.569	0.593	0.593	0.568
	[.3476]	[.3476]	[.3568]	[.3468]	[.3468]	[.356]
Confidence, Abortion (0-1)	0.589	0.590	0.595	0.588	0.589	0.595
	[.3196]	[.3195]	[.3165]	[.3197]	[.3197]	[.3159]
Abortion Importance Pre-Dobbs (0-1)	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.594	0.593
	[.3601]	[.3602]	[.3628]	[.3596]	[.3595]	[.3623]
Age in decades=1	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000
	[.043]	[.0366]	[0]	[.0409]	[.0358]	[0]
Age in decades=2	0.052	0.050	0.016	0.052	0.051	0.017
	[.2219]	[.217]	[.1261]	[.2222]	[.2201]	[.1284]
Age in decades=3	0.095	0.093	0.047	0.095	0.094	0.047
	[.2927]	[.2902]	[.2108]	[.2927]	[.2915]	[.2122]
Age in decades=4	0.127	0.125	0.078	0.128	0.127	0.080
	[.3328]	[.3308]	[.2686]	[.3342]	[.3326]	[.2708]
Age in decades=5	0.182	0.183	0.160	0.184	0.184	0.161
	[.3862]	[.3862]	[.3665]	[.3878]	[.3875]	[.3671]
Age in decades=6	0.283	0.286	0.315	0.285	0.287	0.315
	[.4504]	[.4518]	[.4647]	[.4513]	[.4522]	[.4646]
Age in decades=7	0.206	0.209	0.292	0.203	0.205	0.290
	[.4041]	[.4063]	[.4546]	[.402]	[.4034]	[.4538]
Age in decades=8	0.051	0.052	0.087	0.049	0.050	0.086
	[.2205]	[.2212]	[.2819]	[.2164]	[.2172]	[.2802]
Age in decades=9	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.005
	[.0526]	[.0521]	[.07]	[.0502]	[.0502]	[.0689]
What is your gender?=Man	0.476	0.479	0.537	0.477	0.479	0.541
	[.4994]	[.4996]	[.4986]	[.4995]	[.4996]	[.4983]
What is your gender?=Woman	0.514	0.511	0.455	0.513	0.511	0.452
	[.4998]	[.4999]	[.498]	[.4998]	[.4999]	[.4977]
What is your gender?=Non-binary	0.006	0.006	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.003
	[.0793]	[.0794]	[.0576]	[.0796]	[.0797]	[.0574]
What is your gender?=Other	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	[.0611]	[.0601]	[.0652]	[.0607]	[.0594]	[.064]
Highest level of education completed (1-4)=HS or less	0.273	0.269	0.265	0.271	0.269	0.264
	[.4456]	[.4436]	[.4414]	[.4445]	[.4435]	[.4409]
Highest level of education completed (1-4)=Some college	0.304	0.304	0.299	0.306	0.306	0.299
	[.4598]	[.4599]	[.4579]	[.4607]	[.4607]	[.4578]
Highest level of education completed (1-4)=College grad	0.253	0.255	0.252	0.255	0.256	0.254

	[.4349]	[.4359]	[.4341]	[.4358]	[.4362]	[.4351]
Highest level of education completed (1-4)=Postgrad	0.170	0.172	0.184	0.169	0.170	0.183
	[.3756]	[.3773]	[.3873]	[.3743]	[.3753]	[.3869]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=White	0.778	0.783	0.811	0.778	0.782	0.811
	[.4158]	[.4123]	[.3914]	[.4154]	[.4132]	[.3916]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Black	0.079	0.077	0.072	0.077	0.076	0.071
	[.2692]	[.266]	[.259]	[.2663]	[.2648]	[.257]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Hispanic	0.060	0.057	0.042	0.060	0.058	0.042
	[.237]	[.2321]	[.2009]	[.2375]	[.2344]	[.2009]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Asian	0.025	0.025	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.019
	[.1569]	[.1566]	[.1317]	[.1601]	[.1594]	[.1362]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Native American	0.008	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.007
	[.0878]	[.088]	[.0798]	[.0882]	[.0885]	[.0807]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Two or more races	0.028	0.028	0.023	0.028	0.028	0.023
	[.1639]	[.1638]	[.1494]	[.1649]	[.1642]	[.1512]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Other	0.021	0.021	0.025	0.020	0.020	0.025
	[.1421]	[.1418]	[.1568]	[.1402]	[.1395]	[.1556]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Middle Eastern	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.002
	[.0509]	[.0489]	[.0474]	[.0518]	[.0513]	[.0463]
What is your marital status?=Married	0.525	0.528	0.576	0.525	0.527	0.576
	[.4994]	[.4992]	[.4941]	[.4994]	[.4993]	[.4942]
What is your marital status?=Separated	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.015	0.015	0.014
	[.1216]	[.1208]	[.1183]	[.1217]	[.1218]	[.1174]
What is your marital status?=Divorced	0.132	0.133	0.126	0.132	0.132	0.125
	[.3389]	[.3394]	[.3313]	[.3383]	[.3386]	[.331]
What is your marital status?=Widowed	0.080	0.081	0.099	0.079	0.079	0.098
	[.272]	[.2728]	[.2993]	[.2696]	[.2695]	[.2974]
What is your marital status?=Never married	0.201	0.198	0.147	0.202	0.201	0.150
	[.4006]	[.3982]	[.3544]	[.4013]	[.4004]	[.3565]
What is your marital status?=Domestic / civil partnership	0.047	0.046	0.037	0.047	0.047	0.037
	[.2109]	[.2098]	[.1889]	[.212]	[.2114]	[.1889]
Income=$0	0.031	0.031	0.021	0.032	0.032	0.021
	[.1732]	[.1733]	[.1431]	[.1766]	[.1767]	[.1426]
Income=$1 - $10,000	0.068	0.068	0.052	0.069	0.068	0.053
	[.251]	[.251]	[.2226]	[.2525]	[.2525]	[.2231]
Income=$10,000 - $19,999	0.103	0.103	0.095	0.104	0.104	0.095
	[.3037]	[.3036]	[.2936]	[.3047]	[.3047]	[.2925]
Income=$20,000 - $29,999	0.106	0.106	0.103	0.105	0.106	0.103
	[.3075]	[.3076]	[.3045]	[.3071]	[.3072]	[.3034]
Income=$30,000 - $39,999	0.092	0.092	0.090	0.092	0.092	0.090
	[.289]	[.2891]	[.2866]	[.2893]	[.2892]	[.2868]
Income=$40,000 - $49,999	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
	[.2681]	[.2682]	[.2687]	[.2686]	[.2686]	[.2688]
Income=$50,000 - $59,999	0.074	0.074	0.077	0.073	0.073	0.077
	[.2609]	[.261]	[.2664]	[.2604]	[.2605]	[.2665]
Income=$60,000 - $69,999	0.054	0.054	0.055	0.054	0.054	0.055
	[.2259]	[.226]	[.2286]	[.2257]	[.2257]	[.2278]
Income=$70,000 - $79,999	0.053	0.053	0.059	0.052	0.052	0.059
	[.2235]	[.2235]	[.2347]	[.2227]	[.2226]	[.2348]
Income=$80,000 - $99,999	0.060	0.060	0.065	0.060	0.060	0.065
	[.238]	[.238]	[.2459]	[.2365]	[.2365]	[.2464]
Income=$100,000 - $119,999	0.046	0.046	0.051	0.046	0.046	0.051
	[.2087]	[.2088]	[.2207]	[.2084]	[.2084]	[.2203]
Income=$120,000 - $149,999	0.040	0.040	0.045	0.040	0.040	0.045
	[.1966]	[.1967]	[.2064]	[.1968]	[.1968]	[.2076]
Income=$150,000 - $199,999	0.025	0.025	0.028	0.025	0.025	0.028
	[.1573]	[.1574]	[.1641]	[.1567]	[.1568]	[.1653]

Income=$200,000 - $249,999	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.010
	[.0945]	[.0946]	[.0999]	[.0948]	[.0948]	[.0992]
Income=$250,000 - $349,999	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.007
	[.0799]	[.0799]	[.0845]	[.0799]	[.0799]	[.0855]
Income=$350,000 - $499,999	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	[.0529]	[.0529]	[.0545]	[.0525]	[.0525]	[.0544]
Income=$500,000 or more	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	[.0547]	[.0548]	[.0564]	[.0538]	[.0538]	[.0567]
Income=Prefer not to say	0.150	0.150	0.157	0.149	0.149	0.158
	[.3571]	[.3567]	[.3639]	[.356]	[.3559]	[.3644]
Employment Status=Full-time	0.353	0.353	0.303	0.354	0.353	0.305
	[.478]	[.4778]	[.4596]	[.4781]	[.4779]	[.4605]
Employment Status=Part-time	0.092	0.091	0.080	0.093	0.092	0.081
	[.2884]	[.2882]	[.2717]	[.2907]	[.2896]	[.2726]
Employment Status=Temporarily laid off	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.002
	[.0692]	[.0659]	[.046]	[.069]	[.0661]	[.0449]
Employment Status=Unemployed	0.040	0.039	0.025	0.041	0.041	0.026
	[.1964]	[.1934]	[.1575]	[.1974]	[.1975]	[.1592]
Employment Status=Retired	0.355	0.360	0.469	0.352	0.355	0.466
	[.4786]	[.48]	[.4991]	[.4776]	[.4785]	[.4989]
Employment Status=Permanently disabled	0.074	0.073	0.060	0.075	0.074	0.059
	[.261]	[.2605]	[.2369]	[.2626]	[.2621]	[.2361]
Employment Status=Homemaker	0.051	0.051	0.040	0.051	0.051	0.039
	[.2205]	[.2196]	[.1953]	[.2204]	[.2201]	[.1945]
Employment Status=Student	0.013	0.012	0.005	0.013	0.012	0.005
	[.1148]	[.1102]	[.0695]	[.1128]	[.1106]	[.0719]
Employment Status=Other	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.017	0.016
	[.1283]	[.1272]	[.1237]	[.1294]	[.1294]	[.125]
Religious attendance=More than once a week	0.071	0.071	0.080	0.071	0.071	0.079
	[.2568]	[.2567]	[.2716]	[.2569]	[.2561]	[.2693]
Religious attendance=Once a week	0.166	0.166	0.192	0.164	0.164	0.190
	[.372]	[.3721]	[.3936]	[.3702]	[.37]	[.3921]
Religious attendance=Once or twice a month	0.053	0.052	0.048	0.053	0.052	0.048
	[.224]	[.222]	[.2147]	[.2231]	[.2219]	[.2139]
Religious attendance=A few times a year	0.101	0.102	0.094	0.103	0.103	0.096
	[.3016]	[.3019]	[.2924]	[.3037]	[.3038]	[.294]
Religious attendance=Seldom	0.224	0.223	0.214	0.224	0.224	0.214
	[.417]	[.4163]	[.4101]	[.4172]	[.417]	[.4103]
Religious attendance=Never	0.365	0.368	0.356	0.366	0.368	0.359
	[.4814]	[.4823]	[.4789]	[.4817]	[.4823]	[.4796]
Religious attendance=Don't know	0.020	0.019	0.015	0.019	0.019	0.015
	[.1402]	[.135]	[.1226]	[.1379]	[.1359]	[.1223]
How important is religion in your life?=Very important	0.375	0.374	0.412	0.371	0.370	0.408
	[.4841]	[.4838]	[.4922]	[.4832]	[.4829]	[.4915]
How important is religion in your life?=Somewhat important	0.226	0.225	0.213	0.229	0.228	0.215
	[.4179]	[.4173]	[.4091]	[.42]	[.4197]	[.4109]
How important is religion in your life?=Not too important	0.148	0.148	0.142	0.149	0.149	0.141
	[.3554]	[.3555]	[.3492]	[.3564]	[.3563]	[.3482]
How important is religion in your life?=Not at all important	0.251	0.253	0.233	0.251	0.252	0.236
	[.4338]	[.435]	[.4229]	[.4334]	[.4343]	[.4245]
What is your present religion, if any?=Protestant	0.337	0.338	0.384	0.336	0.336	0.382
	[.4728]	[.473]	[.4862]	[.4723]	[.4722]	[.4858]
What is your present religion, if any?=Roman Catholic	0.181	0.182	0.192	0.180	0.181	0.192
	[.385]	[.3858]	[.394]	[.384]	[.3848]	[.3936]
What is your present religion, if any?=Mormon	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
	[.1128]	[.1125]	[.1122]	[.1129]	[.113]	[.1136]
What is your present religion, if any?=Eastern or Greek Orthodox	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004

	[.0687]	[.0678]	[.0636]	[.0687]	[.0676]	[.0643]
What is your present religion, if any?=Jewish	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.030
	[.1682]	[.1678]	[.1718]	[.1682]	[.1682]	[.1712]
What is your present religion, if any?=Muslim	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.003
	[.064]	[.0632]	[.0555]	[.0652]	[.0645]	[.0546]
What is your present religion, if any?=Buddhist	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.006
	[.0854]	[.0856]	[.0763]	[.0873]	[.0871]	[.0766]
What is your present religion, if any?=Hindu	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.003
	[.0581]	[.0588]	[.0551]	[.059]	[.0594]	[.055]
What is your present religion, if any?=Atheist	0.072	0.074	0.066	0.072	0.073	0.066
	[.259]	[.2609]	[.2483]	[.2589]	[.2601]	[.2489]
What is your present religion, if any?=Agnostic	0.065	0.065	0.055	0.065	0.065	0.055
	[.2466]	[.2473]	[.227]	[.2457]	[.2464]	[.2287]
What is your present religion, if any?=Nothing in particular	0.204	0.202	0.178	0.206	0.205	0.179
	[.4029]	[.4017]	[.3821]	[.4044]	[.4037]	[.3837]
What is your present religion, if any?=Something else	0.079	0.078	0.067	0.079	0.079	0.066
	[.2695]	[.2679]	[.2503]	[.2703]	[.2693]	[.2487]
Which of these statements best describes you?=Immigrant Citizen	0.045	0.044	0.038	0.045	0.045	0.039
	[.2071]	[.2056]	[.192]	[.2082]	[.2072]	[.193]
Which of these statements best describes you?=Immigrant non-citizen	0.017	0.015	0.000	0.016	0.015	0.001
	[.1279]	[.1227]	[.0163]	[.1266]	[.1224]	[.0276]
Which of these statements best describes you?=First generation	0.086	0.086	0.081	0.087	0.087	0.081
	[.2806]	[.2803]	[.2722]	[.2818]	[.2813]	[.2735]
Which of these statements best describes you?=Second generation	0.235	0.237	0.270	0.234	0.235	0.270
	[.4239]	[.4252]	[.4441]	[.4232]	[.4239]	[.4439]
Which of these statements best describes you?=Third generation	0.617	0.618	0.611	0.618	0.618	0.609
	[.486]	[.486]	[.4876]	[.486]	[.4858]	[.4879]
Derived from respondent's state of residence=Northeast	0.178	0.178	0.171	0.178	0.178	0.172
	[.3822]	[.3823]	[.3768]	[.3826]	[.3828]	[.3773]
Derived from respondent's state of residence=Midwest	0.235	0.235	0.236	0.234	0.234	0.234
	[.4241]	[.4241]	[.4244]	[.4233]	[.4234]	[.4236]
Derived from respondent's state of residence=South	0.358	0.358	0.357	0.357	0.357	0.354
	[.4793]	[.4793]	[.4791]	[.4792]	[.4792]	[.4782]
Derived from respondent's state of residence=West	0.230	0.230	0.236	0.231	0.230	0.240
	[.4207]	[.4205]	[.4248]	[.4213]	[.421]	[.427]
Attention to politics=Most of the time	0.586	0.592	0.662	0.584	0.587	0.659
	[.4926]	[.4914]	[.4732]	[.493]	[.4924]	[.4741]
Attention to politics=Some of the time	0.235	0.234	0.209	0.235	0.235	0.208
	[.4237]	[.4233]	[.4064]	[.4242]	[.4242]	[.4059]
Attention to politics=Only now and then	0.095	0.093	0.072	0.097	0.096	0.074
	[.2932]	[.2908]	[.2581]	[.2964]	[.2943]	[.2616]
Attention to politics=Hardly at all	0.065	0.063	0.049	0.065	0.064	0.049
	[.2461]	[.2425]	[.2165]	[.2462]	[.2445]	[.2162]
Attention to politics=Don't know	0.020	0.018	0.009	0.019	0.018	0.010
	[.1389]	[.1324]	[.0935]	[.1365]	[.1336]	[.0996]
Pre-Dobbs Immigration Att.=They should be allowed to stay in the U.S. and apply	0.403	0.403	0.393	0.401	0.401	0.392
	[.4905]	[.4905]	[.4884]	[.4901]	[.4902]	[.4881]
Pre-Dobbs Immigration Att.=They should be allowed to stay in the U.S., but not b	0.111	0.111	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.112
	[.3141]	[.3141]	[.3147]	[.3156]	[.3158]	[.3157]
Pre-Dobbs Immigration Att.=They should be required to leave the U.S.	0.486	0.486	0.496	0.487	0.487	0.496
	[.4998]	[.4998]	[.5]	[.4998]	[.4998]	[.5]
Pre-Dobbs Medicare for all=Favor	0.341	0.339	0.306	0.344	0.343	0.308
	[.4741]	[.4735]	[.4609]	[.4752]	[.4748]	[.4616]
Pre-Dobbs Medicare for all=Oppose	0.387	0.389	0.438	0.384	0.386	0.435
	[.4871]	[.4876]	[.4961]	[.4864]	[.4867]	[.4958]

Pre-Dobbs Medicare for all=It depends on the costs and details	0.272	0.271	0.256	0.271	0.271	0.257
	[.4448]	[.4446]	[.4364]	[.4446]	[.4447]	[.4369]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=Guns should be banned completely	0.066	0.066	0.062	0.066	0.066	0.063
	[.2488]	[.2478]	[.2419]	[.2489]	[.2483]	[.2422]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=More strict	0.418	0.418	0.385	0.417	0.418	0.385
	[.4932]	[.4933]	[.4867]	[.4931]	[.4932]	[.4867]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=Kept the same	0.251	0.253	0.272	0.251	0.251	0.270
	[.4337]	[.4345]	[.4448]	[.4334]	[.4337]	[.4439]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=Less strict	0.133	0.133	0.152	0.134	0.134	0.153
	[.3399]	[.3397]	[.3591]	[.3404]	[.3403]	[.3597]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=There should be no restrictions on gun ownership	0.097	0.096	0.103	0.098	0.097	0.104
	[.2956]	[.2949]	[.3039]	[.2966]	[.2955]	[.3047]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=Not sure	0.035	0.034	0.026	0.035	0.035	0.026
	[.1833]	[.1809]	[.1581]	[.1834]	[.1827]	[.1592]
Observations	50644	49328	21118	53696	52813	21158

Standard deviations in brackets

Additional Transition Matrices Discussed in Main Text

Table A2: N's for Table 1 transition matrices.

Panel A: Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Preferences. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.) = Legal in all cases.

	Current PID						
	SD	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-Dobbs PID							
S. Dem	7169	222	207	34	3	7	1
W. Dem	312	1071	191	59	10	11	7
L. Dem	214	115	1762	140	11	2	3
Independent	48	27	273	1168	58	15	10
L. Rep	0	2	10	52	146	22	15
W. Rep	11	11	20	28	31	288	41
S. Rep	11	1	0	7	11	54	305

Panel B: Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Preferences. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.) = Illegal in all cases.

	Current PID						
	S. Dem	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-Dobbs PID							
S. Dem	195	31	4	10	2	1	4
W. Dem	20	114	7	20	5	7	4
L. Dem	5	8	52	17	5	2	1
Independent	12	7	12	550	120	27	28
L. Rep	0	0	3	65	565	38	95
W. Rep	4	7	2	18	61	330	84
S. Rep	2	1	0	9	104	93	2007

Table A3. Transition matrices similar to those in Table 1 but using the post-Dobbs abortion question instead. Post-Dobbs PID by Pre-Dobbs PID (Cells sum to 100% by row)

Panel A: Abortion Policy Scale Quantiles = 25% most liberal.

	Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)						
	S. Dem	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)							
S. Dem	92.1	3.9	3.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1
W. Dem	16.7	67.2	11.1	3.8	0.3	0.7	0.2
L. Dem	9.4	6.6	75.2	8.1	0.5	0.2	0.1
Indpt	2.5	2.3	14.9	73.4	4.6	1.8	0.5
L. Rep	0.6	0.8	4.4	13.9	64.6	10.5	5.2
W. Rep	2.3	2.2	3.0	4.5	7.4	75.4	5.2
S. Rep	0.9	0.0	0.5	3.6	3.4	11.8	79.7

Panel B: Abortion Policy Scale Quantiles = 25% most conservative.

	Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)						
	S. Dem	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)							
S. Dem	80.5	7.9	1.3	5.4	1.2	1.7	2.0
W. Dem	8.5	67.3	3.2	7.7	3.0	4.8	5.4
L. Dem	4.1	14.1	35.4	31.2	10.6	3.6	1.0
Indpt	0.4	1.5	1.6	73.9	13.4	5.0	4.3
L. Rep	0.0	0.0	0.4	10.3	68.6	6.6	14.0
W. Rep	0.2	1.1	0.2	3.5	8.3	70.7	16.0
S. Rep	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	4.0	4.9	90.6

Panel C: Abortion Policy Scale Quantiles = 25% most liberal minus 25% most conservative.

	Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)						
	S. Dem	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)							
S. Dem	11.6	-4.0	2.1	-5.0	-1.1	-1.7	-1.9
W. Dem	8.2	-0.1	7.8	-3.9	-2.8	-4.1	-5.2
L. Dem	5.2	-7.6	39.8	-23.1	-10.0	-3.4	-0.9
Indpt	2.1	0.8	13.3	-0.5	-8.8	-3.2	-3.8
L. Rep	0.6	0.8	3.9	3.7	-4.1	3.9	-8.8
W. Rep	2.1	1.1	2.7	1.0	-0.9	4.7	-10.8
S. Rep	0.8	-0.0	0.5	3.2	-0.6	6.9	-10.8

Table A4. Transition matrices similar to those in Table 1 but restricted to high importance and high confidence respondents.

Panel A: Net difference in change between those with the most liberal and most conservative policy attitudes among those who report abortion as the most important.

	Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)						
	S. Dem	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)							
S. Dem	11.8	-1.3	2.6	0.3	-11	-2.4	0
W. Dem	7.7	-2.8	1.8	-1.6	0	0	-5.1
L. Dem	12.1	1.9	9	-11.3	-12.3	0.6	0
Indpt	5.3	-0.7	18.3	-7.4	-8.1	-1.8	-5.6
L. Rep	0	0	2.5	12.6	-14.8	2.6	-2.9
W. Rep	0	3	0.7	2.8	-0.2	3.4	-9.7
S. Rep	-0.1	0	0	2.5	-1.7	7.6	-8.3

Panel C: Net difference in change between those with the most liberal and most conservative policy attitudes among those who are most confident in their abortion attitudes.

	Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)						
	S. Dem	W. Dem	L. Dem	Indpt	L. Rep	W. Rep	S. Rep
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)							
S. Dem	16.6	-4.2	1.8	-8.6	-3.3	-0.6	-1.8
W. Dem	17.6	-20.7	12	-9.7	0.8	-0.9	0.8
L. Dem	12.1	-8.3	41.1	-35.2	-7.9	-2.2	0.3
Indpt	2.1	0.8	19.6	-0.9	-14.5	-0.3	-6.7
L. Rep	0	0.9	1.3	12.9	-7.8	3.4	-10.7
W. Rep	2.5	3.9	3.4	4	-6.7	-6.8	-0.3
S. Rep	2.3	-0.1	0	4.4	-4.5	10.8	-13

Additional Regression Results Discussed in Main Text

Table A5. Results from Table 2 holding the sample constant across models.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)					
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Controls for other Pre-Dobbs issue positions			Yes			Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.092	0.072	0.046			
	[0.012]***	[0.011]***	[0.012]***			
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)				0.1	0.083	0.057
				[0.011]***	[0.010]***	[0.011]***
Constant	-0.057	-0.336	-0.35	0.176	-0.109	-0.194
	[0.020]***	[0.184]*	[0.176]**	[0.014]***	[0.187]	[0.182]
Observations	21118	21118	21118	21158	21158	21158
R-squared	0.047	0.075	0.094	0.05	0.076	0.094

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A6. Ordered Probit Models similar to Table 2 in the main text (not first-differenced).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)					
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Controls for other Pre-Dobbs issue positions			Yes			Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.186 [0.012]***	0.148 [0.013]***	0.090 [0.021]***			
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)				0.207 [0.010]***	0.195 [0.011]***	0.103 [0.020]***
Observations	50644	49328	21118	53696	52813	21158

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A7. Ordered Probit Models similar to Table 3 in the main text (not first-differenced).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)					
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.122 [0.025]***	0.046 [0.025]*	0.101 [0.057]*			
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)				0.126 [0.020]***	0.072 [0.018]***	0.159 [0.038]***
Confidence, Abortion (0-1)	-0.294 [0.080]***			0.009 [0.028]		
Conf * Opinion	0.107 [0.033]***			0.137 [0.028]***		
Importance, Abortion (0-1)		-0.722 [0.080]***			-0.177 [0.025]***	
Impt * Opinion		0.220 [0.032]***			0.210 [0.025]***	
Abortion Importance Pre-Dobbs (0-1)			-0.212 [0.135]			-0.016 [0.042]
Pre Dobbs Impt * Opinion			0.093 [0.064]			0.096 [0.046]**
Observations	49269	49558	16696	52791	53075	17582

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A8. Table 3 from the main text with relative confidence and importance substituted.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)			
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators) Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.062	-0.001		
	[0.029]**	[0.021]		
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)			0.056	0.023
			[0.024]**	[0.018]
Relative Confidence abortion	-0.067		-0.029	
	[0.016]***		[0.006]***	
Rel. Conf * Opinion	0.014		0.021	
	[0.007]**		[0.006]***	
Relative Importance abortion		-0.12		-0.034
		[0.014]***		[0.005]***
Rel. Impt * Opinion		0.034		0.033
		[0.005]***		[0.005]***
Constant	0.255	0.418	0.413	0.433
	[0.072]***	[0.055]***	[0.029]***	[0.022]***
Observations	49269	49558	52791	53075
R-squared	0.058	0.06	0.064	0.066

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A9. First main effect specification using 7 different measures of abortion preferences.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)						
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Abortion policy Prefs. #2 (4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.086 [0.007] ***						
Abortion policy Prefs. #3 (5 pt; +=Consv.)		0.046 [0.007] ***					
Identify (1) Pro Choice (2) Other (3) Pro Life			0.09 [0.013] ***				
Abortion morally wrong (6pt; +=Consv.)				0.041 [0.006] ***			
Abortion policy Prefs. #4 (3 pt; +=Consv.)					0.092 [0.011] ***		
Abortion policy Prefs. #5 (4 pt; +=Consv.)						0.059 [0.011] ***	
Abortion policy Prefs. #6 (4 pt; +=Consv.)							0.062 [0.015] ***
Constant	-0.004 [0.013]	0.02 [0.017]	-0.008 [0.020]	0.014 [0.015]	-0.02 [0.017]	-0.016 [0.019]	0.037 [0.028]
Observations	41540	21939	19234	18745	18124	9281	8973
R-squared	0.047	0.044	0.044	0.048	0.046	0.042	0.04

Robust standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A10. Not first differenced version of Table 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)					
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for other Pre-Dobbs issue positions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.118	0.093	0.046			
	[0.009]***	[0.009]***	[0.012]***			
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)				0.139	0.131	0.057
				[0.007]***	[0.008]***	[0.011]***
Constant	0.978	0.901	0.65	1.293	1.265	0.806
			[0.015]***	[0.184]***	[0.176]***	[0.012]***
Observations	50644	49328	21118	53696	52813	21158
R-squared	0.889	0.893	0.923	0.882	0.885	0.922

Robust standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A11. Table 2 column (2) specification, partitioned by prior partisanship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)						
	Pre-Dobbs PID=S. Dem	Pre-Dobbs PID=W. Dem	Pre-Dobbs PID=L. Dem	Pre-Dobbs PID=Ind pt	Pre-Dobbs PID=L. Rep	Pre-Dobbs PID=W. Rep	Pre-Dobbs PID=S. Rep
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.095 [0.015]***	0.136 [0.037]***	0.107 [0.027]***	0.126 [0.019]***	0.056 [0.025]**	0.013 [0.031]	0.058 [0.012]***
Constant	-0.217 [0.123]*	-0.205 [0.290]	-0.942 [0.457]**	0.079 [0.311]	-0.183 [0.265]	-0.342 [0.262]	-1.421 [0.359]***
Observations	14869	4590	5197	7111	4842	3876	8843
R-squared	0.092	0.096	0.060	0.090	0.057	0.099	0.059

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A12. Abortion Factor Score Extremity by Pre-Dobbs Partisanship

	(1) 25% most liberal	(2) middle 50%	(3) 25% most conservative
Dem. (w/ lean)	55.79	36.65	7.56
Indpt.	23.73	48.65	27.62
Rep. (w/lean)	7.60	49.95	42.45

Regression sample. Row percentages sum to 100%.

Table A13. Main results from Table 3, but limiting the sample to those who were asked about their partisanship in either of 2021 or 2022, or in 2022.

	(1)	(2)
	Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in 7-point Partisanship (+=More Republican)	
	Answered PID and Policy in 2021 or 2022	Answered PID and Policy in 2022
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.104	0.093
	[0.015]***	[0.021]***
Constant	0.002	-0.007
	[0.027]	[0.035]
Observations	16036	7978
R-squared	0.053	0.052

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A14. Impact of partisanship on abortion attitudes, using the same change model specified in Table 3.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Change in Abortion Att, Post minus Pre-Dobbs (+=Consv.)		
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Position (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items		Yes	Yes
Controls for other Pre-Dobbs issue positions			Yes
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)	0.082	0.078	0.042
	[0.003]***	[0.003]***	[0.004]***
Constant	0.129	0.455	0.074
	[0.010]***	[0.161]***	[0.129]
Observations	37209	36616	17006
R-squared	0.198	0.243	0.265

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A15. Association between state level bans on abortion and reported change in importance placed on abortion at the individual level.

	Change in Importance, Post minus Pre-Dobbs
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Position (as indicators)	Yes
State has total abortion ban (1/1/24)	0.026
	[0.027]
Constant	1.213
	[0.034]***
Observations	13217
R-squared	0.377

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A16. Replication of models presented in Table 3 of the main text, excluding all those with strong partisan attachments.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)					
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Controls for other Pre-Dobbs issue positions			Yes			Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.115 [0.018]***	0.085 [0.018]***	0.048 [0.019]**			
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)				0.133 [0.016]***	0.102 [0.015]***	0.069 [0.016]***
Constant	-0.027 [0.044]	-0.304 [0.240]	-0.390 [0.231]*	0.251 [0.046]***	-0.031 [0.251]	-0.207 [0.246]
Observations	10830	10830	10830	10860	10860	10860
R-squared	0.037	0.085	0.103	0.043	0.088	0.104

Robust standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A17. 2020 vote choice by pre-*Dobbs* partisanship (Cells sum to 100% by row).

Panel A: 2020 vote choice by partisanship. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.) = Legal in all cases.

	2020 Vote		
Pre-Dobbs PID:	Biden	Other/Not	Trump
Dem. (w/ lean)	89.08	10.12	0.79
Indpt.	36.98	49.64	13.38
Rep. (w/lean)	11.51	25.03	63.46

Panel B: 2020 vote choice by partisanship. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.) = Illegal in all cases.

	2020 Vote		
Pre-Dobbs PID:	Biden	Other/Not	Trump
Dem. (w/ lean)	66.49	22.65	10.87
Indpt.	12.76	36.72	50.52
Rep. (w/lean)	1.53	8.49	89.99

Note: Weighted analysis. Cell entries are percentages within rows (Pre-Dobbs PID)

Table A18. Replication of models presented in Table 3 of the main text, without survey weights.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)					
Controls for Pre-Dobbs Partisanship (as indicators)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for Demographics and other items		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Controls for other Pre-Dobbs issue positions			Yes			Yes
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	0.121 [0.005]***	0.103 [0.006]***	0.058 [0.007]***			
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)				0.140 [0.005]***	0.134 [0.005]***	0.058 [0.007]***
Constant	-0.060 [0.009]***	-0.147 [0.213]	-0.250 [0.122]**	0.263 [0.007]***	0.233 [0.191]	-0.109 [0.122]
Observations	50644	49328	21118	53696	52813	21158
R-squared	0.054	0.059	0.077	0.061	0.067	0.077

Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

The stability of abortion attitudes

In Table A19 we examine the correlates of attitude change by regressing the absolute value of changes in abortion opinions from the pre-*Dobbs* wave to the December 2023 wave. Positive values therefore indicate greater levels of opinion change/instability. This analysis shows that abortion attitudes are more stable for those who are more educated, White respondents (relative to Black, Hispanic, and Native American respondents), those who attend religious services more often (relative to never), those for whom religion is more important to them, Protestants (relative to those who are not religious), and those who are more attentive to politics. When we also include measures of contemporaneous abortion importance and confidence in one's abortion attitudes (discussed in greater detail in main text), both are also associated with greater stability. In a bivariate analysis, the polychoric correlation of abortion policy preferences over time is .67 for those who believe abortion is the least important compared to .89 for those who believe it is the most important. Similarly, the correlation increases from .70 for those who are least confident in their abortion policy positions compared to .89 for those who are most confident in their opinions. In addition to demonstrating the overall average stability of abortion attitudes, this analysis also helps validate the measures of confidence and importance as indicators of holding meaningful opinions.

Table A19. Demographic correlates of attitude changes

	(1)	(2)
	Absolute change in abortion attitudes (0-3)	
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Pref. = "Legal in all cases"		
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Pref. = "Legal in most cases"	0.105	0.087
	[0.012]***	[0.013]***
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Pref. = "Illegal in most cases"	-0.094	-0.115
	[0.018]***	[0.018]***
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Pref. = "Illegal in all cases"	0.272	0.276
	[0.028]***	[0.028]***
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)	-0.002	-0.006
	[0.003]	[0.003]**
Age in decades (Omitted=1)		
Age in decades = 2	0.355	0.332
	[0.093]***	[0.096]***
Age in decades = 3	0.322	0.303
	[0.088]***	[0.091]***
Age in decades = 4	0.299	0.280
	[0.086]***	[0.090]***
Age in decades = 5	0.268	0.247
	[0.086]***	[0.089]***
Age in decades = 6	0.263	0.246
	[0.086]***	[0.089]***
Age in decades = 7	0.254	0.237
	[0.086]***	[0.089]***
Age in decades = 8	0.285	0.270
	[0.087]***	[0.090]***
Age in decades = 9	0.179	0.169
	[0.097]*	[0.100]*

Gender (Omitted=Man)		
Gender = Woman	0.007	0.019
	[0.010]	[0.010]*
Gender = Non-binary	-0.123	-0.109
	[0.045]***	[0.045]**
Gender = Other	-0.015	-0.009
	[0.073]	[0.070]
Education (Omitted=HS or less.)		
Education = Some college	-0.022	-0.017
	[0.013]*	[0.013]
Education = College	-0.046	-0.043
	[0.013]***	[0.013]***
Education = Post-College	-0.051	-0.044
	[0.014]***	[0.014]***
Race (Omitted=White)		
Race = Black	0.119	0.106
	[0.021]***	[0.021]***
Race= Hispanic	0.103	0.105
	[0.039]***	[0.039]***
Race = Asian	-0.072	-0.083
	[0.044]	[0.044]*
Race = Native American	0.133	0.130
	[0.073]*	[0.074]*
Race = 2+	0.045	0.048
	[0.037]	[0.037]
Race = Other	0.015	0.012
	[0.027]	[0.027]
Race = Middle Eastern	-0.051	-0.044
	[0.089]	[0.089]
Marital status (Omitted = Married)		
Marital status = Separated	0.040	0.045
	[0.048]	[0.048]
Marital status = Divorced	0.005	0.005
	[0.013]	[0.013]
Marital status = Widowed	-0.002	-0.004
	[0.014]	[0.014]
Marital status = Never Married	0.001	0.000
	[0.014]	[0.014]
Marital status = Domestic / Civil Partnership	0.029	0.033
	[0.028]	[0.028]
Income (Omitted = None)		
Income = $1 - $10,000	0.067	0.061
	[0.037]*	[0.037]*
Income = $10,000 - $19,999	0.045	0.038
	[0.034]	[0.034]
Income = $20,000 - $29,999	0.069	0.065
	[0.034]**	[0.034]*
Income = $30,000 - $39,999	0.086	0.076
	[0.035]**	[0.035]**
Income = $40,000 - $49,999	0.061	0.053
	[0.036]*	[0.036]
Income = $50,000 - $59,999	0.060	0.053

	[0.035]*	[0.035]
Income = $60,000 - $69,999	0.073	0.070
	[0.036]**	[0.036]**
Income = $70,000 - $79,999	0.056	0.052
	[0.035]	[0.035]
Income = $80,000 - $99,999	0.030	0.028
	[0.035]	[0.035]
Income = $100,000 - $119,999	0.079	0.069
	[0.036]**	[0.036]*
Income = $120,000 - $149,999	0.081	0.074
	[0.037]**	[0.037]**
Income = $150,000 - $199,999	0.052	0.044
	[0.038]	[0.037]
Income = $200,000 - $249,999	0.027	0.022
	[0.042]	[0.042]
Income = $250,000 - $349,999	0.060	0.056
	[0.048]	[0.048]
Income = $350,000 - $499,999	0.071	0.069
	[0.070]	[0.069]
Income = $500,000 or more	0.048	0.041
	[0.082]	[0.082]
Income = Prefer not to say	0.069	0.061
	[0.036]*	[0.035]*
Current employment status (Omitted = Working)		
Current employment status = Part-time	-0.002	0.000
	[0.016]	[0.016]
Current employment status = Temporarily laid off	0.015	0.006
	[0.061]	[0.063]
Current employment status = Unemployed	0.046	0.043
	[0.040]	[0.040]
Current employment status = Retired	0.018	0.017
	[0.013]	[0.013]
Current employment status = Permanently disabled	0.064	0.070
	[0.023]***	[0.023]***
Current employment status = Homemaker	-0.013	-0.016
	[0.030]	[0.030]
Current employment status = Student	0.030	0.039
	[0.052]	[0.052]
Current employment status = Other	-0.040	-0.033
	[0.026]	[0.026]
Religious Service Attendance = More than once a week	-0.111	-0.093
	[0.024]***	[0.024]***
Religious Service Attendance = Once a week	-0.070	-0.057
	[0.019]***	[0.019]***
Religious Service Attendance = Once or twice a month	-0.005	0.000
	[0.022]	[0.022]
Religious Service Attendance = A few times a year	-0.023	-0.020
	[0.018]	[0.018]
Religious Service Attendance = Seldom	-0.030	-0.026
	[0.014]**	[0.014]*
Religious Service Attendance (Omitted = Never)		
Religious Service Attendance = Don't know	0.028	0.042
	[0.067]	[0.066]
Religious Importance = Very important	0.071	0.071
	[0.022]***	[0.022]***

Religious Importance = Somewhat important	0.068	0.058
	[0.019]***	[0.019]***
Religious Importance = Not too important	0.031	0.025
	[0.016]**	[0.016]
Religious Importance (Omitted = Not at all important)		
Religion = Protestant	-0.031	-0.032
	[0.015]**	[0.015]**
Religion = Roman Catholic	-0.003	-0.003
	[0.017]	[0.017]
Religion = Mormon	0.063	0.065
	[0.068]	[0.068]
Religion = Eastern or Greek Orthodox	-0.069	-0.072
	[0.043]	[0.044]
Religion = Jewish	-0.034	-0.028
	[0.022]	[0.022]
Religion = Muslim	-0.008	0.009
	[0.096]	[0.101]
Religion = Buddhist	0.019	0.018
	[0.062]	[0.062]
Religion = Hindu	0.406	0.410
	[0.325]	[0.315]
Religion = Atheist	-0.036	-0.026
	[0.020]*	[0.021]
Religion = Agnostic	-0.049	-0.046
	[0.017]***	[0.018]***
Religion (Omitted = Nothing in particular)		
Religion = Something else	0.004	0.006
	[0.022]	[0.022]
Immigration status = Immigrant Citizen	0.017	0.015
	[0.030]	[0.030]
Immigration status = Immigrant non-citizen	0.040	0.026
	[0.065]	[0.064]
Immigration status = First generation	-0.032	-0.031
	[0.019]	[0.019]
Immigration status = Second generation	0.000	0.000
	[0.009]	[0.009]
Immigration status (Omitted = 3rd generation+)		
Region (Omitted = Northeast)		
Region = Midwest	-0.019	-0.014
	[0.013]	[0.013]
Region = South	-0.012	-0.011
	[0.013]	[0.013]
Region = West	-0.007	-0.006
	[0.016]	[0.016]
Political Interest (Omitted = Most of the time)		
Political Interest = Some of the time	0.014	0.007
	[0.010]	[0.010]
Political Interest = Only now and then	0.045	0.030
	[0.020]**	[0.020]
Political Interest = Hardly at all	0.104	0.078
	[0.030]***	[0.030]***
Political Interest = Don't know	0.264	0.243

	[0.084]***	[0.082]***
Importance, Abortion (0-1)		-0.092
		[0.016]***
Confidence, Abortion (0-1)		-0.057
		[0.016]***
Constant	-0.020	0.112
	[0.096]	[0.100]
Observations	36616	36055
R-squared	0.071	0.075

Robust standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A20. Demographic and political characteristics of matched and mismatched voters.

Variable	Pre-Dobbs Mismatched Democrats	Pre-Dobbs Other Democrats	Pre-Dobbs Mismatched Republicans	Pre-Dobbs Other Republicans
Pre- to Post-Dobbs Change in Partisanship (+=More Republican)	0.545	0.135	-0.318	-0.077
	[1.271]	[.8111]	[1.1684]	[.7286]
Pre-Dobbs PID (1=SD; 7=SR)	1.706	1.616	6.200	6.304
	[.7268]	[.795]	[.7368]	[.8269]
Current PID (1=SD; 7=SR)	2.251	1.750	5.882	6.227
	[1.4162]	[1.0722]	[1.2796]	[.9931]
Pre-Dobbs Abortion Policy Prefs. (Preferred measure, 4 pt; +=Consv.)	4.000	1.640	1.000	2.987
	[0]	[.6499]	[0]	[.6654]
Abortion Policy Preferences Scale (+=Conservative)	0.521	-0.743	-0.450	0.565
	[.9479]	[.8763]	[.9471]	[.6684]
Importance, Abortion (0-1)	0.632	0.729	0.502	0.500
	[.3702]	[.2919]	[.3576]	[.3506]
Confidence, Abortion (0-1)	0.555	0.625	0.536	0.587
	[.3688]	[.3151]	[.3282]	[.31]
Abortion Importance Pre-Dobbs (0-1)	0.687	0.572	0.418	0.630
	[.3863]	[.3624]	[.3657]	[.3497]
Age in decades=1	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.001
	[0]	[.0497]	[0]	[.0283]
Age in decades=2	0.091	0.071	0.040	0.026
	[.2872]	[.2561]	[.1956]	[.1579]
Age in decades=3	0.129	0.111	0.104	0.060
	[.3354]	[.3137]	[.305]	[.2374]
Age in decades=4	0.189	0.138	0.141	0.092
	[.3915]	[.345]	[.3484]	[.2886]
Age in decades=5	0.223	0.177	0.216	0.183
	[.4169]	[.3819]	[.4114]	[.3869]
Age in decades=6	0.220	0.276	0.288	0.310
	[.4145]	[.4469]	[.4529]	[.4625]
Age in decades=7	0.114	0.186	0.160	0.251
	[.3182]	[.3891]	[.3663]	[.4335]
Age in decades=8	0.035	0.037	0.050	0.074
	[.184]	[.1895]	[.2181]	[.2614]
Age in decades=9	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.004
	[0]	[.0435]	[.0495]	[.0635]
What is your gender?=Man	0.373	0.409	0.401	0.531
	[.484]	[.4916]	[.4902]	[.4991]
What is your gender?=Woman	0.615	0.577	0.598	0.465
	[.487]	[.494]	[.4905]	[.4988]
What is your gender?=Non-binary	0.008	0.011	0.002	0.001
	[.0868]	[.1052]	[.0384]	[.0238]
What is your gender?=Other	0.004	0.003	0.000	0.004
	[.065]	[.0537]	[0]	[.0608]
Highest level of education completed (1-4)=HS or less	0.380	0.216	0.306	0.292
	[.4859]	[.4113]	[.4611]	[.4548]
Highest level of education completed (1-4)=Some college	0.331	0.292	0.293	0.323
	[.4711]	[.4546]	[.4552]	[.4677]
Highest level of education completed (1-4)=College grad	0.171	0.277	0.252	0.247
	[.3767]	[.4474]	[.4345]	[.4313]
Highest level of education completed (1-4)=Postgrad	0.118	0.216	0.149	0.138
	[.3229]	[.4114]	[.356]	[.3444]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=White	0.460	0.693	0.837	0.899
	[.4989]	[.4612]	[.3694]	[.3013]

What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Black	0.334	0.149	0.017	0.009
	[.4719]	[.3564]	[.1288]	[.0932]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Hispanic	0.131	0.067	0.065	0.037
	[.3375]	[.2498]	[.2468]	[.1883]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Asian	0.018	0.036	0.039	0.010
	[.1328]	[.1859]	[.1925]	[.0975]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Native American	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.007
	[.0739]	[.0695]	[.0849]	[.084]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Two or more races	0.030	0.032	0.023	0.016
	[.1696]	[.177]	[.1507]	[.1243]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Other	0.020	0.014	0.009	0.022
	[.1399]	[.116]	[.0954]	[.1455]
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?=Middle Eastern	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.001
	[.0505]	[.0633]	[.0524]	[.0363]
What is your marital status?=Married	0.442	0.454	0.495	0.625
	[.497]	[.4978]	[.5002]	[.4841]
What is your marital status?=Separated	0.017	0.017	0.007	0.012
	[.1303]	[.129]	[.0829]	[.1097]
What is your marital status?=Divorced	0.151	0.143	0.155	0.120
	[.3582]	[.35]	[.3618]	[.3247]
What is your marital status?=Widowed	0.091	0.072	0.101	0.091
	[.2883]	[.2582]	[.301]	[.288]
What is your marital status?=Never married	0.242	0.258	0.190	0.118
	[.4287]	[.4374]	[.3928]	[.3221]
What is your marital status?=Domestic / civil partnership	0.057	0.057	0.052	0.034
	[.2327]	[.2318]	[.2221]	[.1816]
Income=$0	0.073	0.035	0.027	0.023
	[.2609]	[.1827]	[.1615]	[.1511]
Income=$1 - $10,000	0.118	0.072	0.067	0.051
	[.3227]	[.258]	[.2508]	[.219]
Income=$10,000 - $19,999	0.122	0.106	0.098	0.100
	[.3275]	[.3084]	[.2968]	[.2996]
Income=$20,000 - $29,999	0.128	0.107	0.100	0.107
	[.3344]	[.3096]	[.2994]	[.3086]
Income=$30,000 - $39,999	0.073	0.092	0.091	0.093
	[.26]	[.2885]	[.2878]	[.2906]
Income=$40,000 - $49,999	0.094	0.078	0.078	0.084
	[.2922]	[.2676]	[.2685]	[.278]
Income=$50,000 - $59,999	0.046	0.074	0.085	0.077
	[.2095]	[.2621]	[.2793]	[.2668]
Income=$60,000 - $69,999	0.030	0.058	0.053	0.055
	[.1718]	[.2332]	[.2238]	[.227]
Income=$70,000 - $79,999	0.026	0.053	0.053	0.059
	[.1589]	[.2231]	[.2247]	[.2352]
Income=$80,000 - $99,999	0.031	0.063	0.052	0.063
	[.1734]	[.2437]	[.2216]	[.2425]
Income=$100,000 - $119,999	0.025	0.048	0.054	0.046
	[.1569]	[.2144]	[.2251]	[.2092]
Income=$120,000 - $149,999	0.053	0.040	0.055	0.042
	[.2233]	[.1949]	[.2285]	[.2014]
Income=$150,000 - $199,999	0.025	0.027	0.041	0.025
	[.1551]	[.1608]	[.1973]	[.1573]
Income=$200,000 - $249,999	0.007	0.010	0.004	0.009
	[.0809]	[.0987]	[.0614]	[.0953]
Income=$250,000 - $349,999	0.001	0.006	0.004	0.007
	[.0349]	[.0792]	[.0606]	[.0844]
Income=$350,000 - $499,999	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.004

	[0]	[.0486]	[.0506]	[.0604]
Income=$500,000 or more	0.003	0.002	0.006	0.003
	[.0552]	[.0465]	[.0746]	[.0576]
Income=Prefer not to say	0.146	0.128	0.132	0.152
	[.3534]	[.3337]	[.3384]	[.3591]
Employment Status=Full-time	0.362	0.372	0.419	0.322
	[.4812]	[.4834]	[.4936]	[.4673]
Employment Status=Part-time	0.104	0.096	0.099	0.083
	[.3058]	[.2951]	[.2993]	[.2766]
Employment Status=Temporarily laid off	0.001	0.006	0.010	0.004
	[.0293]	[.0752]	[.0974]	[.0641]
Employment Status=Unemployed	0.063	0.044	0.034	0.024
	[.2437]	[.2039]	[.1804]	[.1527]
Employment Status=Retired	0.241	0.328	0.285	0.430
	[.4283]	[.4693]	[.4517]	[.4951]
Employment Status=Permanently disabled	0.096	0.074	0.087	0.066
	[.2943]	[.2614]	[.2821]	[.249]
Employment Status=Homemaker	0.086	0.044	0.049	0.050
	[.2813]	[.2059]	[.2168]	[.2187]
Employment Status=Student	0.029	0.018	0.006	0.006
	[.1671]	[.1326]	[.0761]	[.0754]
Employment Status=Other	0.017	0.019	0.011	0.014
	[.1306]	[.1354]	[.1043]	[.118]
Religious attendance=More than once a week	0.181	0.032	0.026	0.111
	[.3855]	[.175]	[.1598]	[.3146]
Religious attendance=Once a week	0.234	0.104	0.078	0.246
	[.424]	[.3057]	[.2683]	[.4308]
Religious attendance=Once or twice a month	0.082	0.046	0.058	0.063
	[.2741]	[.2089]	[.2343]	[.2429]
Religious attendance=A few times a year	0.089	0.094	0.099	0.120
	[.2851]	[.2918]	[.2987]	[.3253]
Religious attendance=Seldom	0.156	0.225	0.269	0.228
	[.363]	[.4177]	[.4434]	[.4193]
Religious attendance=Never	0.225	0.488	0.458	0.214
	[.4176]	[.4999]	[.4985]	[.4099]
Religious attendance=Don't know	0.034	0.012	0.012	0.018
	[.1805]	[.1066]	[.1101]	[.132]
How important is religion in your life?=Very important	0.643	0.227	0.241	0.543
	[.4797]	[.4189]	[.4279]	[.4982]
How important is religion in your life?=Somewhat important	0.162	0.205	0.264	0.251
	[.3684]	[.4036]	[.441]	[.4336]
How important is religion in your life?=Not too important	0.089	0.173	0.213	0.116
	[.2852]	[.3779]	[.4095]	[.3202]
How important is religion in your life?=Not at all important	0.107	0.396	0.282	0.091
	[.309]	[.489]	[.4502]	[.287]
What is your present religion, if any?=Protestant	0.363	0.227	0.259	0.491
	[.4813]	[.4189]	[.4382]	[.4999]
What is your present religion, if any?=Roman Catholic	0.229	0.146	0.198	0.216
	[.4203]	[.3527]	[.3986]	[.4114]
What is your present religion, if any?=Mormon	0.007	0.005	0.012	0.021
	[.0803]	[.0715]	[.107]	[.1418]
What is your present religion, if any?=Eastern or Greek Orthodox	0.005	0.003	0.009	0.007
	[.067]	[.0542]	[.0919]	[.082]
What is your present religion, if any?=Jewish	0.021	0.044	0.045	0.019
	[.1433]	[.2045]	[.2073]	[.1356]
What is your present religion, if any?=Muslim	0.009	0.007	0.002	0.001
	[.0951]	[.0846]	[.0494]	[.029]

What is your present religion, if any?=Buddhist	0.013	0.013	0.004	0.002
	[.1132]	[.1113]	[.0655]	[.0485]
What is your present religion, if any?=Hindu	0.003	0.004	0.020	0.002
	[.055]	[.0603]	[.141]	[.0386]
What is your present religion, if any?=Atheist	0.027	0.139	0.074	0.012
	[.161]	[.3454]	[.2623]	[.1096]
What is your present religion, if any?=Agnostic	0.014	0.106	0.050	0.025
	[.1184]	[.3072]	[.2173]	[.1569]
What is your present religion, if any?=Nothing in particular	0.184	0.234	0.260	0.129
	[.3879]	[.423]	[.4385]	[.3346]
What is your present religion, if any?=Something else	0.127	0.075	0.068	0.076
	[.3331]	[.2631]	[.2515]	[.2656]
Which of these statements best describes you?=Immigrant Citizen	0.095	0.049	0.069	0.032
	[.2936]	[.2158]	[.2543]	[.1757]
Which of these statements best describes you?=Immigrant non-citizen	0.010	0.023	0.016	0.005
	[.0973]	[.1487]	[.1249]	[.0716]
Which of these statements best describes you?=First generation	0.127	0.101	0.078	0.065
	[.3337]	[.3012]	[.2683]	[.2472]
Which of these statements best describes you?=Second generation	0.116	0.231	0.236	0.251
	[.3201]	[.4214]	[.4248]	[.4336]
Which of these statements best describes you?=Third generation	0.652	0.597	0.601	0.647
	[.4767]	[.4906]	[.49]	[.478]
Derived from respondent's state of residence=Northeast	0.195	0.202	0.226	0.146
	[.3964]	[.4016]	[.4186]	[.3529]
Derived from respondent's state of residence=Midwest	0.248	0.221	0.215	0.250
	[.4322]	[.4147]	[.4113]	[.4331]
Derived from respondent's state of residence=South	0.395	0.319	0.356	0.398
	[.4893]	[.4663]	[.479]	[.4895]
Derived from respondent's state of residence=West	0.163	0.258	0.202	0.206
	[.3694]	[.4374]	[.402]	[.4044]
Attention to politics=Most of the time	0.410	0.618	0.411	0.636
	[.4923]	[.486]	[.4922]	[.4812]
Attention to politics=Some of the time	0.263	0.242	0.287	0.230
	[.4405]	[.4284]	[.4523]	[.4208]
Attention to politics=Only now and then	0.161	0.085	0.166	0.079
	[.3676]	[.2782]	[.3719]	[.2701]
Attention to politics=Hardly at all	0.113	0.044	0.105	0.047
	[.3163]	[.2047]	[.3069]	[.2116]
Attention to politics=Don't know	0.055	0.012	0.032	0.008
	[.2274]	[.108]	[.1763]	[.0892]
Pre-Dobbs Immigration Att.=They should be allowed to stay in the U.S. and apply	0.552	0.720	0.253	0.159
	[.4984]	[.449]	[.4354]	[.3654]
Pre-Dobbs Immigration Att.=They should be allowed to stay in the U.S., but not b	0.136	0.104	0.072	0.120
	[.3438]	[.3058]	[.2591]	[.3252]
Pre-Dobbs Immigration Att.=They should be required to leave the U.S.	0.312	0.176	0.674	0.721
	[.4644]	[.3804]	[.4691]	[.4485]
Pre-Dobbs Medicare for all=Favor	0.624	0.667	0.230	0.075
	[.4853]	[.4711]	[.4212]	[.2641]
Pre-Dobbs Medicare for all=Oppose	0.119	0.048	0.371	0.700
	[.3238]	[.2127]	[.4833]	[.4584]
Pre-Dobbs Medicare for all=It depends on the costs and details	0.258	0.285	0.399	0.225
	[.4382]	[.4514]	[.4901]	[.4176]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=Guns should be banned completely	0.197	0.127	0.053	0.010
	[.3984]	[.3326]	[.2243]	[.1006]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=More strict	0.525	0.743	0.297	0.147
	[.5]	[.4369]	[.4569]	[.3544]

Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=Kept the same	0.140	0.076	0.351	0.416
	[.3478]	[.2645]	[.4774]	[.493]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=Less strict	0.050	0.017	0.127	0.240
	[.2189]	[.1274]	[.3327]	[.4269]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=There should be no restrictions on gun ownership	0.055	0.013	0.134	0.162
	[.2288]	[.1118]	[.3412]	[.3684]
Pre-Dobbs Gun Policy=Not sure	0.032	0.025	0.039	0.025
	[.1748]	[.1569]	[.1938]	[.1547]
Observations	514	27129	1066	18813

Standard deviations in brackets